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THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
GERALD GENE BLUBAUGH, 
Defendant/Appellant 
Case No. 940060-CA 
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ADDENDUM A 
Trial Transcript, p. 1363 
(Trial Court's Ruling on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss) 
Ruling on Defendant's Motion to Arrest Judgment 
or in the Alternative for a New Trial 
that this defendant did it. 
Counsel asked what evidence do we have 
that he applied the force that harmed the child. 
The fact that the child was harmed. We submit it. 
THE COURT: I'll deny your motion to 
dismiss, Counsel. We'll call the jury. You may 
proceed with your evidence. I think that the prima 
facia case has been made. 
MR. MUSSELMAN: Could we get about three 
minutes to talk to our witnesses? 
THE COURT: You can talk to them while 
we're calling the jury. 
(Recess taken) 
THE COURT: The record ought to reflect 
that the jury is seated in the State of Utah versus 
Gerald Blubaugh. We will then continue. We've 
been delayed a few moments as we have addressed 
some legal matters, ladies and gentlemen of the 
jury. 
Counsel, then, are you prepared to call 
your first witness? 
MR. MUSSELMAN: We are, your Honor. 
Defense calls Gerald Blubaugh. 
THE COURT: Mr. Blubaugh, if you'll come 
forward, please. 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF UTAH, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
GERALD G. BLUBAUGH, 
Defendant. 
RULING ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
TO ARREST JUL J M E N T OR IN THE 
ALTERNATIVE FOR A NEW TRIAL 
Case No. 921400519 
Judge Lynn W. Davis 
This matter came before the court on Defendant's Motion to Arrest Judgment or in 
the Alternative for a New Trial filed on July 15, 1993. The State filed its responsive brief 
on July 21, 1993, The court, having entertained oral argument on July 27, 1993 and 
sentencing has been stayed until the court rules on the motion, now enters the following 
RULING 
The defendant moves this court to arrest judgment based on Rule 23 of the Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure. Rule 23 provides in pertinent part: "At any time prior to the 
imposition of sentence, the court upon its own initiative may, or upon motion of a defendant 
shall, arrest judgment if the facts proved or admitted do not constitute a public offense/ 
The defendant contends that the court should arrest judgment and enter a judgment of 
dismissal based on the following : (1) there was no evidence presented that the defendant 
caused the death of Faith Barney, (2) there was no evidence presented that the defendant 
engaged in any conduct which created a grave risk of death to another, (3) there was no 
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evidence that the defendant knew that any conduct which he engaged in created a grave risk 
of death to another, (4) there was no evidence that defendant's conduct evidenced a depraved 
indifference to human life, (5) there was no evidence that the defendant had ever harmed 
Faith Barney in any way, and (6) there was substantial evidence that Christy Barney more 
likely than not, caused the injuries which resulted in Faith Barney's death. In the alternative, 
the defendant asks that the court to order a new trial based on an error in the jury verdict. 
The state argues the court has previously ruled on defendant's motion to dismiss after 
presentation of the state's case, finding that the state had presented a prima facie case, and 
therefore, the defendant's motion is redundant. Additionally, the state maintains that the 
state has presented sufficient evidence to sustain the verdict. 
I. FACTS 
On a Motion to Arrest Judgment, the trial must view the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the jury verdict. State v. Workman. 212 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 4 (Utah 1993); 
State v. Diaz. 220 Utah Adv. Rep. 29 (Utah App. 1993); State v. Sherard. 818 P.2d 554, 
556 (Utah App. 1991), cert, denied. 843 P.2d 516 (Utah 1992). 
On August 8, 1992, Faith Barney died at Primary Children's Hospital of injuries 
which she had received a few days earlier. She had been flown by Life Flight from 
Mountain View Hospital in Payson, Utah on August 5, 1992. After her death, an autopsy 
was performed to determine the cause of death. The autopsy indicated extant cranial and 
vertebral injuries. Specifically, the child's skull was fractured and the interspinous ligaments 
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were severed at the thoracic vertebrae. The direct causes of death was described as anoxia 
(deprivation of oxygen from the brain) which was caused either by the skull fracture or other 
contemporaneous mechanism which deprived the child of oxygen for a sufficient amount of 
time to trigger brain swelling. The testimony as to the time at which the injuries occurred 
was not exact. The time frame varied from as long as twenty-four hours to three hours prior 
to Faith's first CAT scan. The medical experts testified that the injuries which caused the 
child's death were non-accidental trauma. 
In addition to the injuries which resulted in the child's death, the state presented 
evidence of battered child syndrome. Faith had suffered a broken right arm and a broken 
left arm in the recent past. The child's right arm was treated approximately one week after 
the break. The broken left arm was never treated. The injury to the child's right arm was 
deemed a non-accidental trauma by the treating physician. The injuries to the child did not 
begin to occur until after the defendant began living with Christy Barney. 
Faith's caretakers were Christy Barney and the defendant, Christy's live-in boyfriend. 
The defendant had joint care and custody of Faith. The defendant was present in the home 
on the evening of August 4, 1992, and in the early morning hours of August 5, 1992. The 
defendant was the first person to awake on the morning of August 5, 1992 and alerted 
Christy Barney to the child's erratic breathing and possible respiratory problems. The state 
presented evidence that the defendant struck the child on numerous times, at least on one 
occasion the defendant struck the child in the head. The defendant maltreated the child. The 
3 
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defendant would restrain the child in his arms by pressing her legs into her chest in order to 
stop her from crying and would forcibly hold her eyes shut until the child would go to sleep. 
The defendant denied that he engaged in any harmful conduct towards the child and 
presented evidence suggesting that Christy Barney was more likely than not to have caused 
the injuries which resulted in death, 
H. APPLICABLE LAW 
The trial court may arrest judgment "when the evidence, viewed in the light most 
favorable to the verdict, is so inconclusive or so inherently improbable as to an element of 
the crime that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt as to that element." 
State v. Workman. 212 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 4 (Utah 1993). This standard is the same 
standard which an appellate court adheres to in determining the sufficiency of the evidence 
on appeal. Id. at 4. See also State v. Petree. 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983); State v. 
McCardelL 652 P.2d 942, 945 (Utah 1982). 
The Workman court commented on the important role that the jury plays when 
evidence is controverted: "When the evidence presented is conflicting or disputed, the jury 
serves as the exclusive judge of both credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given 
particular evidence. . . . Ordinarily, a reviewing court may not reassess credibility or 
reweigh the evidence, but must resolve conflicts in the evidence in favor or the jury verdict." 
Id. at 4 (citations omitted). 
4 
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When the evidence presented consists entirely of circumstantial evidence, the role of 
the trial court is to determine first "whether there is any evidence that supports each and 
every element of the crime charged," and lastly, "whether the inferences that can be drawn 
from the evidence have a basis in logic and reasonable human experience sufficient to prove 
each legal element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt," Workman, 212 Utah Adv. 
Rep, at 4, "A guilty verdict is not legally vand if it is based solely on inferences that give 
rise to only remote or speculative possibilities of guilt." Id. 
The defendant was charged with depraved indifference murder pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-5-203(1) (c) which states: "(1) Criminal homicide constitutes murder if the actor: 
(c) acting under circumstances evidencing a depraved indifference to human life engages in 
conduct which creates a grave risk of death to another and thereby causes the death of 
another." Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501 (2) requires that the elements of a criminal offense 
contain a conduct element (actus reus) and a culpable mental state element (mens rea). The 
Utah Supreme Court set forth the elements of depraved indifference murder in State v. 
Bolsinger. 699 P.2d 1214, 1219 (Utah 1985) as follows: (1) "the defendant engaged in 
conduct which created a grave risk of death to another and that conduct resulted in the death 
of another," (2) "the defendant knew that his conduct or the circumstances surrounding his 
conduct created a grave risk of death to another," and (3) "the defendant acted under 
circumstances evidencing a depraved indifference to human life - a qualitative judgment to 
be made by the jury in determining the extent of the defendant's conduct. It is not a 
•Cw; 6 2 2 
description of the mens rea involved in the commission of the crime, but an evaluation of the 
actus reus." Id. 
There is sufficient circumstantial evidence to support a finding that the defendant 
engaged in conduct which created a grave risk of death to another. The child suffered from 
battered child syndrome and the injuries which resulted in her death were non-accidental. 
The defendant admitted to hitting the child on the head on at least one occasion. There was 
testimony concerning the improper method the defendant used to force the child to stop 
crying and go to sleep. The jury could draw from this testimony that the defendant conduct 
was consistent with the child's back injury. The defendant had joint care of the child prior 
to her hospitalization and was present in the home the evening prior to and the morning of 
her hospitalization. Additionally, the physical abuse of the child did not begin until after the 
defendant became a joint caretaker of the child. The jury could make the reasonable 
inference from this evidence that the defendant engaged in the conduct which gravely risked 
the death of death to Faith Barney during the late evening of August 4 or early morning of 
August 5. 
There is sufficient evidence that the defendant knew that the conduct would create a 
grave risk of death. The jury could draw the inference that the defendant knew that striking 
a child on the head with sufficient force to cause a skull fracture would cause a grave risk of 
death. 
There is sufficient evidence that the defendant's conduct evidenced a depraved 
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indifference to human life. The jury was presented with evidence that the defendant had 
acted with indifference in the past to the child. The defendant, in response to criticism over 
his forcibly squeezing the child to make the her stop crying, squeezed harder. There is 
evidence that the defendant, who had received EMT training in the military, and was one of 
the caretakers of the child, failed to immediately treat the child's broken arms. Additionally, 
with respect to the injuries which resulted in the child's death, the jury could reasonably 
infer that these injuries resulted from conduct evidencing a depraved indifference to human 
life. 
m. CONCLUSION 
The defendant was found guilty of murder by a jury of his peers. A panel of 
prospective jurors, totalling approximately 70 citizens, was summoned. Each answered an 
extensive jury questionnaire. Counsel extensively evaluated the questionnaires before in 
camera voir dire began. 
Mr. Blubaugh was present during all stages of the jury selection process and 
consulted with his attorneys. Li addition, two alternate jurors were chosen. Where any 
inkling of bias, prejudice or passion appeared in the response to the jury questionnaire or in 
voir dire, the State of Utah either challenged for cause or this Court granted defenses motion 
to remove for cause. The jury selection process took several days. The parties exercised all 
peremptory challenges and the jury was impaneled and sworn. 
The court administered the following oath to the jury: 
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Do you and each of you solemnly swear to well and truly try the issues pending 
between the plaintiff and the defendant and render a true and just verdict according to 
the evidence and the instructions of the court, so help you God? 
It is the opinion of the court that the jury in this case was extremely conscientious; the jurors 
were very attentive, some took notes, they were timely, they appeared to listen very carefully 
during presentation of the evidence. This court has tremendous respect for their personal 
sacrifices and the fact that they attended to civic duty so willingly. They served in an 
unsolicited, unwelcome, difficult role, but one which is significant and important to the 
administration of justice. 
Where there is sufficient evidence to support the verdict, this court will give 
deference to the jury's decision. Regardless of how this judge personally feels about whether 
the state proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt, it would be improper for this court to 
invade the exclusive domain of the jury and to substitute its judgment for that of the jury. It 
is the role of the factfinder, in this case the jury, to weigh the evidence and assess the 
credibility of the witnesses. 
Jurors can take into account the ability and the opportunity to observe and know the 
things about which each witness has testified, the memory, manner, and conduct of each 
witness while testifying, any interest each witness may have in the result of the trial, and the 
reasonableness of such testimony considered in light of all the evidence in the case. The 
defendant testified in this case. In weighing the defendant's testimony, the jury could take 
into consideration the defendant's interest in the matter. The jury had the duty also to give 
8 
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Dated at Provo, Utah this £Z_ day of /%6/oJ . 1993. 
BY THE COURT 
Jim Taylor, Deputy County Attorney 
Linda Anderson, Esq. 
John Musselman, Esq. 
10 
such testimony the same fair and impartial consideration that it is instructed to give all the 
evidence in the case. 
The jury was instructed to conscientiously and dispassionately consider the evidence 
and to apply the law to reach a just verdict regardless of what the consequences of such 
verdict would be. What credibility the jury accorded the defendant's testimony is unknown. 
Defendant's challenge assumes that the jury believed defendant's version. 
The defendant's arguments are essentially a reiteration of defendant's closing 
arguments. They evidently did not persuade the jury of Mr. Blubaugh's peers then and are 
not persuasive as a matter of law now. Accordingly, the court denies defendant's Motion to 
Arrest Judgment or in the Alternative for a New Trial. 
9 
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TabB 
ADDENDUM B 
Jury Instruction No. 4 
Record, pp. 424-23 
INSTRUCTION NO. 4 
You are instructed that "depraved indifference to human life" 
means that the defendant acted knowingly in creating a grave risk 
of death which he knew was grave in that it created a highly likely 
probability of death and that the defendant's conduct evidenced an 
utter callousness and indifference toward human life. 
D. JOHN MUSSELMAN (5582) f o r : 
ZABRISKIE & MUSSELMAN 
At to rneys f o r D e f e n d a n t 
3507 N o r t h U n i v e r s i t y Avenue 
Hanover B u i l d i n g , S u i t e 370 
Jamestown S q u a r e 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Te lephone : (801) 375-7680 
F a c s i m i l e : (801) 375-7686 
LINDA ANDERSON (5908) f o r : 
ANDERSON, DREDGE, STRINGER fc BLAKELOCK, P .A. 
A t t o r n e y s f o r De fendan t 
2230 N o r t h U n i v e r s i t y Parkway 
S u i t e 9-D 
Provo, UT 84604 
Te lephone : (801) 375-7678 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
— o o o O o o o — 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GERALD GENE BLUBAUGH, 
Defendant. 
DEFENDANT'S OBJECTIONS TO 
PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
Case No. 921400519 FS 
—-oooOooo— 
COMES NOW the Defendant above named, by and through his 
counsel of record, D. JOHN MUSSELMAN and LINDA ANDERSON, and 
does hereby make his objections to certain jury instructions 
heretofore requested by the Plaintiff. For convenience in making 
reference to Plaintiff's requests herein, Defendant has numbered 
the Plaintiff's requests PI through P20 and has attached a 
complete copy of the Plaintiff's Proposed Jury Instructions* 
1. Defendant objects to request P3 upon the ground and for 
the reason that the said requested instruction fails to 
adequately state the elements of the offense charged and, 
moreover, the Defendant's request D3 more accurately and 
adequately states the elements of the offense and more correctly 
states the law as to the elements. 
2. Defendant objects to request P4 upon the ground and for 
the reason that the said requested instruction fails to 
adequately define the term "depraved indifference" and is, in 
fact, a misstatement of the law as to that definition. The said 
requested instruction was specifically disapproved of in the case 
of State v. StandifordP 769 P.2d 254 (Utah 1988). The State has 
submitted an alternative request P4 which is a correct statement 
of the law, but the Defendant has submitted a modified requested 
instruction D4a which is a correct statement of the law and more 
accurately and adequately defines the term "depraved 
indifference" according to current rulings of the Utah Supreme 
Court. 
3. Defendant objects to request P7 upon the ground and for 
the reason that the said requested instruction is premature 
inasmuch as a lesser included offense instruction must be 
2 
TabC 
ADDENDUM C 
Trial Transcript, pp. 758-60 
Jury Instruction No. 19 
J. Q 
that that will not inconvenience you in terms of 
a ping-pong match sending you back to the jury 
room, and then back to the jury box, and back 
and forth. But these are important matters. As 
they come up during the course of the trial 
we'll need to rule upon them. 
Likewise, objections will be made during 
the course of this trial. Some of those can be 
ruled upon fairly quickly and very briefly based 
upon what the Court has heard. And that can be 
done while you are thus convened as a jury. 
There may be instances, though, when those 
objections involve other legal matters or 
additional arguments before the Court. And at 
that time you would also be excused to the jury 
room; and at such time as those have been ruled 
upon, invited back to further consider the 
evidence before the Court. 
Now, as I read to you the-- I believe the 
first jury instruction, which outlined the 
charge here, murder, a first-degree felony, it's 
also my duty to advise you of the maximum 
penalties in this case. 
First-degree felony, murder or otherwise, 
is punishable by incarceration in the Utah State 
Lesley Nelson -- CSR 
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1 Prison for a period of five years to life 
2 together with the possibility of the imposition 
3l of a $10,000 fine and/or both. 
4| Now, with those preliminary instructions 
5 that I've read to you, and with the general 
61 outline that I've given to you concerning the — 
7 how we will proceed in this case, I'll inquire 
8 of counsel whether there are any other 
9 preliminary matters that ought to be brought to 
10 the attention of this jury before we proceed? 
11 MR. TAYLOR: I have one. May we 
12 approach the bench briefly? 
13 THE COURT: You may. 
14 ( Off the record at the bench, not 
15 reported.) 
16 THE COURT: Going back on the record. 
17 I've advised you of the penalties-- the 
181 possible penalties imposed in a first-degree 
19 felony. 
20 I need to further bring to your attention 
21 that ultimately, if there is a conviction in the 
221 case, it would be the province of the Court to 
23 impose that penalty. You're not involved in the 
241 penalty phase whatsoever. You have nothing to do 
251 with that. It would not make any recommendations 
I 
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1 or even be present while-- there would be any 
2 imposition of a penalty 1 in fact, the 
3 defendant were convicted in the case. 
41 Anything further, then, in this particular 
51 case? 
6 MR. TAYLOR: No. 
7 THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, it's 
8 the intention, then, of the State of Utah and 
9 the defense to proceed this afternoon at 1:30, 
10 at which time the State will make opening 
11 statements at that point in time. 
12 You are then free until that hour, until 
13 1:30. And once again, as 1 excuse you, albeit a 
14 bit early for the lunch hour, I will advise you 
15 not to discuss this case with anyone, amongst 
16 eachother or anyone else during the pendancy of 
17 these matters, not to attempt to learn anything 
18 about this case outside the presence of this 
19 courtroom. 
20 Some of you may have already taken some 
21 notes. I'll advise you not to share those notes 
22 with anyone in the jury. And lastly, not to 
23 attempt in any form or fashion to learn anything 
24 about this case from the media, from radio, 
25| television, or the newspaper. And with that 
Lesley Nelson -- CSR 
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INSTRUCTION NO. . 
In arriving at a verdict in this case, you shall not discuss 
nor consider the subject of penalty or punishment, as that is a 
matter which lies with the court, and other court proceedings. 
The penalty and punishment for the crime charged must not in any 
way affect your decision as to the guilt or innocence of the 
defendant. 
TabD 
ADDENDUM D 
Ruling on Defendant's Motion for Bill of Particulars 
Information 
Affidavit 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF UTAH, STATE OF UTAH 
Ui...i LV. 
— Deputy 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
GERALD GENE BLUBAUGH, 
Defendant. 
RULING 
Case No. 921400519 
Judge Lynn W. Davis 
This matter came before the Court on defendant's Motion for Bill of Particulars. The 
Court heard the oral argument of counsel on April 27, 1993. The Court has reviewed the 
file, considered the memoranda of counsel, entertained argument of counsel, and upon being 
advised in the premises, now makes the following: 
RULING 
Article 1, section 12 of the Utah Constitution provides, "In criminal prosecutions the 
accused shall have the r i g h t . . . to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against 
him [and] to have a copy thereof.M The Utah Supreme Court has explained this section to 
mean that "the accused be given sufficient information so that he or she can know the 
particulars of the alleged wrongful conduct and can adequately prepare his or her defense." 
State v. Bell. 770 P.2d 100, 103 (Utah 1988), quoting. State v. Fulton. 742 P.2d 1208, 1214 
(Utah 1987). A criminal defendant's right to a bill of particulars is provided for in Rule 4 
• - J ^ v. 298 
(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which states as follows: 
When facts not set out in an information or indictment are required to inform a 
defendant of the nature and cause of the offense charged, so as to enable him 
to prepare his defense, the defendant may file a written motion for a bill of 
particulars. The motion shall be filed at arraignment or within ten days 
thereafter, or at such later time as the court may permit. . . . The request for 
and contents of a bill of particulars shall be limited to a statement of factual 
information needed to set forth the essential elements of the particular offense 
charged. 
The focus in a bill of particulars is the allegation that the defendant's ability to prepare for 
trial is impeded due to some vagueness in the allegedly deficient pleading. State v. Swapp. 
808 P.2d 115, 117 (Utah App. 1991); State v. Bell. 770 P. 2d 100, 106 (Utah 1988). 
On November 17, 1992, the defendant submitted a bill of particulars seeking "the 
prosecution to set out in writing the factual information needed or relied on exclusively by 
the prosecution to establish the essential elements of this offense charged." On December 2, 
1992, the court received plaintiffs Response to Defendant's Motion for Bill Particulars. The 
State essentially argues that the information filed along with a four page affidavit in support 
of the warrant of arrest, as well as volumes of information given in discovery has more than 
adequately allowed defendant to prepare for trial. A preliminary hearing has also been 
conducted in this case and no appeal has been taken from the bind over order. 
In Defendant's Response to Plaintiffs objection to Defendant's Motion for Bill of 
Particulars, the defendant essentially argues that the Information and Affidavit are 
impermissibly vague because the defendant is unable to distinguish which of three possible 
2 
theories the state intends to use in order to prove the "depraved indifference" element of the 
charged offense. A bill of particulars "is not a device to enable the defendant to obtain a 
preview of the prosecutor's evidence. Swapp. at 118. "However, the defendant is entitled 
to whatever information the prosector has that may be useful in helping to fix the date, time 
and place of the offense." Id. at 188-19. There is nothing in defendant's Response which 
demonstrates any confusion as to the elements of the offense charged. In fact, the defendant 
has been charged only under section 76-5-203 (1) (c). The defendant, at the time the 
Information was served, was put on notice of the nature of the offense, the elements needed 
to be proven by the state, and defendant's conduct which the state believes supported the 
charges. Defendant's inquiry into how the state intends to prove its case is outside the scope 
of a bill of particulars. 
The Court exercises its discretion and finds, after reviewing the information and the 
affidavit supporting it, that the defendant has adequately been informed of the time, place and 
date of the charged offense. The Court finds that the defendant has received ade* uate notice 
of the facts underlying the "depraved indifference" murder statute. In support of this finding 
the Court notes that the affidavit supporting the Information contains information pertaining 
to previous injuries suffered by the victim prior to the injury immediately causing death. 
The affidavit identifies the defendant as one of the victim's two caretakers. Additionally, the 
affidavit recounts some of the medical examiner's autopsy report detailing the cause of death 
as resulting from a blow to the head and back received shortly before death. 
3 
Accordingly, the Court hereby denies defendant's Motion for a Bill of Particulars. 
Dated at Provo, this 3 day of y^f/i/ . 1993. 
BY THE COURT 
cc: Jim Taylor, Deputy County Attorney 
John Musselman, Esq. 
Linda Anderson, Esq. 
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KAY BRYSON #0473 
Utah County Attorney 
100 East Center, Suite 2100 
Provo, Utah 84606 
(801) 370-8026 
FILED 
otu?lJna'cls> D'strictCourt 
r A mil A °^nU\State of Utah 
CARMA B. SMITH, Cter 
IN THE FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT OP UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH, SPANISH FORK I/EPARTMENT 
STATE OP UTAHf 
VS. 
Plaintiff, 
GERALD GENE BLUBAUGH 
144 East Center 
Spanish Fork, Utah 
DOB: 09-09-68 
CHRISTY BARNEY 
144 East Center 
Spanish Fork, Utah 
DOB: 01-18-75 
Defendant(s). 
INFORMATION 
Criminal No. ?<£/- £ 7? 
Kay Bryson, Utah County Attorney, State of Utah, accuses the 
defendant(s) of the following crime(s): 
MURDER, a First Degree felony, in violation of 76-5-202, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, in that the defendants, on 
or about August 5, 1992, in Utah County, Utah, acting under 
circumstances evidencing a depraved indifference to human life 
engaged in conduct which created a grave risk of death to another 
and thereby caused the death of another, Faith Barney. 
Information is based on evidence sworn to by: Steven Adams, 
Spanish Fork PD 
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IN THE FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT OP UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH, SPANISH FORK DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH# t 
APPIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OP 
Plaintiff, t WARRANT OP ARREST 
vs. t 
GERALD G. BLUBAUGH and s Criminal No. 
CHRISTY L. BARNEY# 
Defendant(s). 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss. 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
STEVEN G. ADAMS, being first duly sworn upon his oath deposes 
and says: 
1. I am a police officer for the City of Spanish Fork, Utah 
County, Utah. I have been employed as a police officer for seven 
years and hold the rank of Sergeant. 
2. I am currently assigned as case officer on the death of a 
child, Faith Barney, a fourteen month old female, occurring August 
8, 1992. 
3. On July 14, 1992, I was informed by the Children's Justice 
Center and the Department ~f Family Services that Faith Barney had 
been referred to the Departent of Family Services for an "unusual" 
elbow break. The Department requested for the follow up by the 
Spanish Fork Police Department. I contacted Mountain View Hospital 
in Payson where the child had been taken for treatment for the 
broken arm. I spoke to emergency room doctors and nurses who 
treated the child who told me that they were informed that the 
caretakers for the child were Christy Barney, the child's mother 
and Gerald Gene Blubaugh, a live-in boyfriend of the mother. These 
caretakers had explained to medical personnel that the child had 
fallen off a bed causing the elbow break. The medical evidence 
observed by the doctors and nurses at the emergency room at 
Mountain View Hospital was inconsistent with an injury of that 
sort. 
4. Doctors L. Dean Egbert, Stan Green and Scott Jackson 
explained to me that the elbow break x-rays indicated a break 
occurring at least ten to twelve days prior to the child being 
brought to the emergency room at Mountain View Hospital on July 1, 
1992. 
5. On July 31, 1992, I spoke with Christy Barney at her 
residence in Spanish Fork. Christy Barney restated the description 
of the child falling off the bed and breaking her elbow that was 
given to emergency room personnel at Mountain View Hospital and was 
unable to provide another plausible explanation for the elbow 
break. 
6. Faith Barney was observed on July 31, 1992, in the home of 
Christy Barney. The child had dirt on all of her extremities and 
her face and had what appeared to be food on her body and face. 
She did appear to be well fed and ambulating and moving under her 
own power. 
7. On August 5, 1992, the Spanish Fork Ambulance was called 
to the Barney home in Spanish Fork. Faith Barney was reported to 
be seizing, vomiting and unresponsive. The child was transported 
at that time to Mountain View Hospital. 
8. On August 5, 1992, Chief Rosenbaum of the Spanish Fork 
Police Department was requested by the ambulance team to respond to 
the Barney home. Rosenbaum spoke with Christy Barney and Gerald 
Gene Blubaugh who are the adult residents of that address. The two 
related the following series of events: At 0500 Gerald Gene 
Blubaugh rose for work. Gerald Gene Blubaugh heard the baby having 
a difficult time breathing. Blubaugh awoke Christy Barney and 
Barney attended to the child while Blubaugh left for work. Barney 
reports that she held the child for a short time and felt the child 
was breathing. Barney then laid the child back down in the crib 
face up. At 0800 Barney awoke and found the child face down in 
what appeared to be vomit. Barney picked the child up and found 
the child to be gray in color, limp, and eyes rolled upwards. 
Barney put a robe on and took the child to a neighbor where a phone 
was located and 911 was called. Ambulance personnel arrived and 
took the child to Mountain View Hospital. 
9. On August 5, 1992, Faith was flown by Life Flight from 
Mountain View Hospital to Primary Children's Hospital. 
10. On August 8, 1992, I was informed by Doctor Malloney of 
Primary Children's Hospital that Faith had become deceased. 
11. On August 9, 1992, I viewed the autopsy of Faith Barney. 
The Medical Examiner has issued a complete autopsy report providing 
the following opinion: 
This fourteen month old Caucasian female, Faith N. 
Barney, died as a consequence of craniocerebral injury 
due to blunt force injury of the head. A skull fracture, 
whose microscopic appearance is consistent with a 
fracture of several days duration, was present on the 
left parietal bone. No cerebral impact or contrecoup 
injuries w^re present, suggesting that the head may have 
been sta* cnary when struck. The sequelae of the blunt 
force in .ry of the head were seizures, cerebral edema, 
and neuronal ischemia/anoxia. 
The pattern of subgaleal hemorrhage of the left scalp, 
which involved multiple areas and a greater area of the 
scalp than that overlying the fracture, suggests that the 
scalp may have been subjected too more than a single blow 
in the recent past. The patter^ of fibrosis and vascular 
proliferation of the galea ci :he left parietal scalp 
suggests injury also occurred in the relatively remote 
past. 
The interspinous ligaments of one segment of the thoracic 
vertebral column were transected, and the underlying 
epidural space was hemorrhagic. The most probable injury 
mechanism is extreme forward flexion of the torso. On 
the basis of the postmortem findings it cannot be 
determined whether the cranial and vertebral injuries 
were inflicted at the same time or at different times. 
12. Officers of the Spanish Fork Police Department have 
interviewed Gerald Gene Blubaugh on two separate occasions. 
Blubaugh has admitted striking the child more than once on the 
child's head and still is unable to give any satisfactory 
explanation for the injuries resulting in her death or the breaks 
to her arm shortly before her death. 
13. Officers have also interviewed Christy Barney on several 
occasions with similar results. Mrs. Barney is unable to explain 
any of the injuries to the child including the irjuries immediately 
resulting in her death or to give a satisfactory explanation for 
the broken arm. 
14. I have interviewed all known or available neighbors and 
associates of Blubaugh and Barney and have determined that the only 
persons providing care for Faith Barney between August ""1st and 
August 5th of 1992 were Gerald Gene Blubaugh and Christy Barney. 
Prior to that time they were the principal caretakers. She was not 
left in the care or custody of anyone else for any significant 
period of time except during the weekend of the 24th oi July, 1992, 
when she was cared for by an adult babysitter. The babysitter has 
been interviewed and there is no documentation or evidence that 
there were any injuries to the child during that period of time. 
15. Most of the individuals interviewed in connection with 
this case have described the method of parenting and caretaking by 
Gerald Gene Blubaugh and Christy Barney as violent, neglectful, and 
abusive. Numerous incidents of physical abuse and neglect have 
been described during the month preceding the child's death. 
16. Gerald Gene Blubaugh's employer, Mr. Blubaugh, and 
Christy Barney have all explained to me that his work has been 
inconsistent and that because of the death of Faith he has been 
discouraged. Officers have observed Mr. Blubaugh during daytime 
hours when he would normally be expected to be at work and have 
suspected that his work is "spotty". Blubaugh is a cement laborer 
who would have work when his employer is able to contract for work. 
17. Christy Barney attends Landmark High School and is 
approximately two years from graduation. Mrs. Barney is pregnant 
with the child of Mr. Blubaugh. Mrs. Barney has been informed that 
if she is unable to graduate this year that her unborn child will 
be taken from her. Contacts with Landmark High School indicate 
that the likelihood of her graduation within a year is very slight. 
18. Both Blubaugh and Barney have spoken about leaving the 
area with Blubaugh's mother, Ruth Peterson, as recently as August 
14, 1992. 
DATED this /s ^ day of October, 1992. 
[•EVEN^G: ADAMS 
Affiant 
PROOF BY AFFIDAVIT HAVING BEEN MADE THIS DAY BEFORE ME, THE 
COURT FINDS THAT THERE IS PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A 
WARRANT OF ARREST. SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME THIS isg'* 
DAY OF OCTOBER, 1992. 
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ADDENDUM E 
Trial Transcript, pp. 1581-85 (Ruling #1) 
Trial Transcript, pp. 1608-12, 1617 (Ruling #2) 
Trial Transcript, pp. 1677-81 (Ruling #3) 
Trial Transcript, pp. 1786-89 (Ruling #4) 
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1 THE COURT: At least as the defense's 
2 perspective is is that you're not going to attack 
3 her credibility. What you're going to do is 
4 corroborate her --
5 MR. TAYLOR: That's right, and if her 
6 credibility is not at issue, when she says she 
7 doesn't remember, then we accept that she doesn't 
8 remember. It doesn't matter why she doesn't 
9 remember. 
10 If it matters why, then we're talking 
11 about her character, because they want to infer 
12 from that she could have committed this crime. 
13[ That's what's inappropriate. 
14 THE COURT: Well, let me retire to 
15 chambers, Counsel. I wish I had 30 days to rule on 
16 this motion. I will be back by 11. 
17 (Recess taken) 
18 THE COURT: Back on the record in State of 
19 Utah versus Gerald Blubaugh, Case No. 921400519. 
20 Counsel and the defendant are present. 
21 The Court's had an opportunity to review both the 
22 motion in limine and the response, and makes the 
23 following ruling. 
24 I've reduced it to writing, Counsel, 
25 because it does involve a reference to a case or 
2 The defendant during opening statement 
3 and in chambers has indicated his intent to offer 
4 testimony concerning Christy Barney, Specifically 
5 that Christy Barney suffers from a mental condition 
6 which causes her to suffer memory loss, and that 
7 during memory loss she acts violently. 
8 The defense intends to show specific 
9 instances of conduct towards the mother, towards 
10 the brother and the baby, together with 
11 professional testimony regarding the mental 
12 condition of Christy Barney. 
13 The defendant's purported purpose in 
14 seeking admittance of this testimony is to prove 
15 that Christy Barney was more likely to have 
16 committed this offense. The defense seeks this 
17 testimony through expert witnesses and through the 
18 extrinsic evidence of these particular events. 
19 The State has objected to this evidence 
20 based on Rule 608 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, 
21 that the State contends that proffered testimony is 
22 in fact character evidence and ought to be 
23 excluded. The State contends that Rule 404(a) 
24 prohibits introduction of this testimony, and the 
25 testimony is also prohibited by Rule 608. 
15S3 
1! Rule 404 must be read in conjunction with 
2 the entire Article 4, Relevancy and its Limits, 
31 Article 4 begins by setting forth the 
4 rules for determining relevancy and the 
5 admissibility of relevant evidence. Rule 404(a) is 
61 an extens.cn of these initial sections. 
7 404(a) states evidence of a person's 
8 character or a trait of his character is not 
9 admissible for the purpose of proving that he acted 
10 in conformity therewith on a particular occasion. 
11 Historically, courts have reached that conclusion 
12 by virtue of the fact that it's more prejudicia 
13 than probative. 
14 The rule then lists several exceptions. 
15 This court notes that none of the exceptions listed 
16 in 404(a) apply in this case, but the rule does not 
17 end there. 
18 While Rule 404(a) closes the door to the 
19 admittance of character evidence for the purpose of 
20 proving that the witness acted in conformity on a 
21 particular occasion, Rule 404(b) opens the door to 
22 evidence offered for the enumerated purposes of 
23 motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 
24 knowledge, identity, absence of mistake or 
25 accident. 
±oo3 
1 Therefore, the initial inquiry must also 
2 include a determination of whether the proffered 
31 evidence meets one of these exceptions. The Court 
41 finds that it does. 
5 The defendant's case is that another 
6 person, Christy Barney, killed the child. The 
7 proffered testimony is relevant to this point. The 
8 proffered testimony obviously goes to the identity 
9 of the person who injured the child. It may also 
10 go to opportunity, intent and knowledge. 
11 While it may also corroborate Christy 
12 Barney's testimony and thus indirectly evidences 
13 her veracity, it does so only indirectly. Justice 
14 Durham, in referring to State verse Rimmasch as 
15 relied upon by the State of Utah, writing in her 
16 concurrent opinion states, "Much expert testimony 
17 indirectly tends to show that another witness 
18 either is or is not telling the truth. That fact 
19 alone does not preclude admission of testimony 
20 under Rule 608." 
21 Simply put, Rule 608 does not apply in 
22 this situation, and will not act as either a bar or 
23 a door to the admittance of evidence indirectly 
24 supportive or destructive of a witness' veracity. 
25 Accordingly, this court denies plaintiff's 
1554 
1 motion in limine. w^v**. ^  „ 
2 determination of admittance of presentment of 
3 evidence based upon proper foundation, the 
4 establishment of the credentials of expert 
5 witnesses, and still deal with the issue of 
6 relevancy. 
71 With that, we'll invite the jury back in. 
Si MR. TAYLOR: Your Honor, one matter as 
9 they're coming in. Yesterday during the testimony 
10 of Kenny Revoir it became apparent we would call a 
11 rebuttal witness. That rebuttal witness has been 
12 here during the course of the trial. I've spoke 
13 with counsel about him. He's agreed that there's 
14 no problem with her remaining, because she's only 
15 going to talk about that testimony which she's 
16 already heard. 
17 THE COURT: Exclusively as it relates to 
18 his? 
19 MR. TAYLOR: Right. 
20 MR. MUSSELMAN: We have no objection, and 
21 furthermore, your Honor, frankly I don't think 
22 there's any objection for us to have on a rebuttal 
23 witness that we can't necessarily be made aware of. 
24 MR. TAYLOR: Normally I would have 
25 immediately excluded her, but she's asked to 
15SJ 
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1 against those that she loves and that she's grown 
2 up with and cares about. 
3 Furthermore, we believe that when Chris is 
4 called to the stand again, that she will testify 
5 that when she woke up on August the 5th at 
6 8 o'clock, she will recall the circumstances 
7 surrounding that awakening, so to speak, as very 
8 reminiscent of the time when she -- this time when 
9 she kind of came to. I don't really know how to 
10 phrase this, but came to and had a butcher knife in 
11 her hand chasing her brother and her cousin. 
12 Those are referred to in letters. That 
13 incident is referred to in letters. She will draw 
14 some correspondence between the two events herself 
15 on testimony. 
16 THE COURT: Well, she's best able to do 
17 that. Not him, it would seem to me. It does 
18 appear to me, Counsel, as it relates to that 
19 evidence — I don't know whether it's relevant to 
20 give some additional background regarding the fact 
21 that they are adopted or that they are brother and 
22 sister. I don't see the real relevancy there 
23 regarding any of that background, but perhaps you 
24 could point to that if you wish. 
25 But it is more prejudicial than 
< r '-
probative. It's too remote in timef and I do 
believe that it is factually dissimilar to this 
particular case. There's no evidence in this case 
that there's a knife used or a weapon used to 
administer any harm to this particular child. 
It's too remote in time. There was no 
injury as it relates to that. It's an older 
brother. It's not a younger sibling. It's not a 
child involved. 
So I question/ number one, its relevancy. 
I believe it's more prejudicial than probative. 
It's factually dissimilar. It's too remote in 
time. Do you wish to call him in light of that 
ruling? 
MS. ANDERSON: Well, I think under those 
circumstances it would probably be somewhat 
fruitless. However, I do think it's important in 
light of that ruling that we also consider the 
calling of Cory Talbot. Cory Talbot would 
corroborate Mr. Lowe's testimony for that one 
particular event. I would assume that your ruling 
would be similar. 
MR. TAYLOR: We would have the same 
objection. 
THE COURT: I make the same ruling if it's 
O D 3 
based upon that same evidence. It would appear to 
me that the fact that a cousin was either involved 
or witnessed it, it's still too remote in time. 
There's no injury involved. Tell me the age of the 
cousin. If the cousin is a minor child of maybe 
two or one or whatever. 
MS. ANDERSON: No, he's of a 
contemporaneous age. 
THE COURT: If he's approximately the same 
age as Tom Lowe, then that's another factor that 
this court would consider that it's factually 
dissimilar to this case and be more prejudicial 
than probative, too remote in time, no injury and 
factually dissimilar. Therefore, the Court 
questions its relevancy. 
MS. ANDERSON: Can I have just a moment? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. TAYLOR: We have one more proffer 
apparently in the correspondence. 
MS. ANDERSON: The other witness that we 
probably should proffer is Becky Roman. Becky 
Roman is Chris Lowe and Tom Lowe's adoptive 
mother. 
I believe that Mrs. Roman would testify 
that Chris lived with her for a period of time 
1610 
initially right after Faith was born. I believe 
that there would be testimony as to Chris' 
parenting skills when Faith was a young infant. 
Mrs. Roman and her husband reported Chris for 
neglect to DFS, and I believe she would testify 
regarding those incidents. 
We've also presented the Court yesterday 
with a letter that's been marked as Defense 
Exhibit 20. Ms. Roman would authenticate that 
letter as having been received, and believing it to 
be from Christy Barney. 
MR. TAYLOR: Your Honor — 
THE COURT: Well, there are two issues, 
then. Let's go first to some indication as it 
relates to her parenting skills and the fact that 
she was reported to DFS. 
MR. TAYLOR: With regard to Becky Roman's 
observations of Christy and Faith, and the 
interaction and what her parenting skills, I think 
that's relevant. I'm not going to object to that. 
MS. ANDERSON: Naturally, Mrs. Roman is 
also aware of the incidence with Tom. She's the 
mother of these two people. 
THE COURT: I would not anticipate -- I 
would rule the same as it relates to Becky Roman 
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1 foundation and that's got to come through. 
2 THE COURT: I'll allow testimony regarding 
3 parenting skills and interaction, what she viewed 
4 as interaction between Christy Barney and Faith 
5 Barney. I think that's relevant. I think it's 
6 relevant in terms of time, and I think that that 
7 would also extend to her reference of Christy 
8 Barney, her own adopted daughter, to DFS. I 
9 believe. That's all admissible. It's relevant. 
10 I believe as it relates to this letter, 
11 she may testify she received it. That's not a 
12 basis for its admissibility, but you can get that 
13 far with this letter. 
14 THE COURT: Anything further, then, as it 
15 relates to Ms. Roman? 
16 MS. ANDERSON: I think that covers it, your 
17 Honor. 
18 THE COURT: Very well. Be in recess until 
19 1:30. 
20 (Noon recess) 
21 THE COURT: Recalling the case of State of 
22 Utah versus Gerald Blubaugh, Case No. 921400519. 
23 Record ought to reflect that the jury is 
24 seated, and the defendant is present with counsel 
25 and the State is represented. You may proceed, 
« ^ 1G17 
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1 radio, TV, and newspaper comments about the trial, 
2 in addition not have any contact with counsel or 
3 with any of the witnesses or the parties involved* 
4 With that, I'll excuse you and we'll address these 
5 legal matters, then bring you back in just a 
6 moment. 
7 (Jury excused) 
81 THE COURT: You may be seated. Counsel if 
9 you'll restate your objection on the record and 
10 then have Mr. Musselman you may respond to that. 
11 MR. TAYLOR: I am presuming, and Counsel, 
12 correct me if I'm wrong — 
13 THE COURT: Perhaps we ought to have a 
14 proffer as it relates to what the expected 
15 testimony might be, and then we can better address 
16 it from that perspective, Counselor. 
17 MR. MUSSELMAN: Certainly, your Honor. As 
18 I understand it, what Chris Barney would testify to 
19 is that the feeling she had at 8 a.m. on the 5th of 
20 August is very similar to a feeling she had at 
21 about age 13 or so in her life, upon which occasion 
22 she came to or woke up or whatever the terminology 
23 is, was in the process of cornering I think her 
24 brother in the house, who was a year or so older 
25 than her. She had a butcher knife in her hand. 
• w V ^ X iU • i 
1 She had no idea how she got there. Had no idea 
2 why, how the butcher knife got in her hand. Had no 
3 idea why she would be doing what she was doing. 
4 The feeling upon gaining consciousness in 
5 that context was very, very similar to the feeling 
6 she had when gaining consciousness at 8 o'clock in 
7 the morning on August 5. 
8 MR. TAYLOR: Your Honor, I think Counsel 
9 can ask her if the feeling corresponded with a 
10 feeling of dread, a feeling of fear, a feeling of 
11 regret. But the incident with her brother is 
12 distant in time, distant in fact, and to try and 
13 draw that conclusion is so speculative and is so 
14 distant in time as to render it far more 
15 prejudicial than it would be probative. 
16 MR. MUSSELMAN: Your Honor, I felt that the 
17 Court's ruling this morning was that the material 
18 as to these prior acts was admissible on the 
19 grounds that you indicated in your ruling. 
20 THE COURT: Well, I found them to be 
21 inadmissible, except for they may be relied upon by 
22 the expert involved, and that beyond that I thought 
23 my ruling, if I can turn to it, is that I found 
24 specifically that they were too remote in time. 
25 They were more prejudicial than probative. They 
- ^  1 U . D 
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were factually dissimilar. Now, you're saying that 
the feeling was similar. 
MR. MUSSELMAN: That the feeling upon the 
waking up or coming to is similar, is what her 
testimony I think already has been. 
THE COURT: And they were not with a child 
or anyone under those circumstances. I think 
you're entitled to inquire whether they are 
consistent with feelings she may have had coming 
out of a memory lapse when she was 12 years old, 
but as to the details of that, I don't believe 
that's admissible. 
MR. MUSSELMAN: Without going into any of 
the details, Judge, are we entitled to go as far as 
asking her whether she was engaged in a violent 
episode when coming to? 
THE COURT: I don't think so. It's too 
dissimilar in time and it's too dissimilar in terms 
of facts. The question is, if she has these memory 
lapses en a frequent basis or infrequent basis, 
certainly there would have been one between age 12 
and age 16 on August the 5th of that date. There's 
got to be something that could tie it in closer 
than some four year lapse. 
MR. MUSSELMAN: I haven't asked her yet, 
* + l— C\ 
1 but I think if I asked her we'll find a series of 
2 memory lapse throughout her life, between those two 
3 periods of time. 
4 This is a specific episode that she 
5 relates the feeling of coming out of a particular 
6 memory lapse doing something that she was shocked 
7 to find herself doing on the one occasion. I 
8 certainly tend to ask her about other memory 
9 lapses, and as I understand it, maybe I should ask 
10 her now --
11 THE COURT: No. 
12 MR. MUSSELMAN: -- since the jury is gone. 
13 Well, in any event my understanding is that there 
14 have been a series of memory lapse events 
15 throughout, at least that period of her life 
16 between age 13 and the present. 
17 THE COURT: Well, and you may confirm 
18 whether those are associated with alcohol or 
19 whether this one was or whether that one was and 
20 variety of things that way. 
21 I think that may be probative, but I 
22 think it's far too prejudicial to associate some 
23 undefined, unarticulated feeling that she may have 
24 had on the morning of August the 5th of 1992 with 
25 some unarticulated feeling she may have had when 
iGc-0 
1 she was 12 years old. 
21 MR. TAYLOR: Your Honor, in addition, the 
3 State is very concerned that she's being asked to 
4 characterize or categorize what has happened during 
5 the periods of blackout, when by their very nature 
6 she doesn't remember. 
7 MR. MUSSELMAN: Well, I'm not going to ask 
8 her that. 
9] THE COURT: Well, I'm going to rule, 
10 Counsel, that they are too disparing in time and 
11 factually dissimilar. If she has an opinion 
12 relative to tne fact that her feelings on that 
13 morning were comparable to those at a time when she 
14 came out of a blackout, I'll allow that. But 
15 beyond that I think it's far too prejudicial. It's 
16 more certainly than it is probative. It's remote 
17 in time. It's factually dissimilar, and she's not 
18 even able to articulate these feelings. 
19 MR. MUSSELMAN: All right. 
20 THE COURT: That's my ruling. You can 
21 continue. 
22 (Short recess taken) 
23 THE COURT: Back on the record, then, on 
24 State of Utah versus Blubaugh, Case No. 921400519. 
25 Before the jury comes back in and is 
LKUL/AT€> ^ y j 
but I think if I ask him he'll tell you that's what 
he relies on in cases like that in making his 
professional judgment. He's relying on those as a 
part of his overall diagnosis and assessment in 
arriving at an opinion as to what she does during 
memory blackouts. 
THE COURT: Well, this leap is the thing 
that concerns me the most, because if I interpret 
his testimony correctly and she goes into these 
anytime she has stress, and she has significant 
stress every single day, and for the vast majority 
of that time under those circumstances she is not 
violent in any way, then the inference — I guess 
that's the question. Whether he can legitimately 
testify under those circumstances that she has more 
propensity for violence under those circumstances 
or not. 
MR. MUSSELMAN: The point is it's opinion 
evidence. He's an expert. He has an opinion. We 
might disagree with it. 
THE COURT: His credentials have been 
stipulated to. His procedures appear to be 
sound to the Court in arriving at that, and I think 
he can testify as to his diagnosis of the 
psychogenetic amnesia disorder. I'll not allow him 
to do so 
which is 
to a yet unpublished unrecognized volume 1 
still in the critique and review stage, or 
any disorder that's not contained within that 
recognized presently. 
I guess, Counsel, I think it's relevant 
that he can testify respecting issues of memory 
blackout 
the fact 
I think it comes at issue by virtue of 
that she testifies that in close proximity 
to the times that the injuries may have occurred to 
the child that she has many blackouts. 
You may voir dire as it relates to the 
issue ultimately of how he reaches any conclusion 
respecting the propensity for violence. 
bringing 
specific 
would be 
of time, 
MR. TAYLOR: I can't do that without 
up the incidents that we have --
THE COURT: I know. I don't want any 
incidents to come before this jury that 
removed by virtue of considerable amount 
and which have been restricted throughout 
the course of this trial, finding that they're are 
far more prejudicial than probative. 
MR. TAYLOR: Let me state, your Honor, and 
again Counsel may wish to present this through the 
witness and I can understand that. But the State 
is willing to stipulate that Dr. Howell has 
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2 0 
2 1 
22 
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24 
2 5 
examined her. That he's a licensed and reputable 
psychologist, and that he has concluded that there 
is a basis for a conclusion that she has a 
psychological ttate that causes her to have loss of 
memory related to stressful events, which could 
include times wnen she is violent. 
THE COURT: What's wrong with that 
stipulation, Counsel? That's about all you can get 
in, isn't it? 
MR. MUSSELMAN: fcell, I suppose it is, your 
Honor, and certainly we're interested in saving 
time if we can stipulate to qualifications and 
that, but I do think that the opinion evidence and 
the methodology of arriving at it is critical, and 
I think the jury ought to hear and viev the witness 
as to that so we can assess his demeanor as well, 
in deciding what weight to give it. 
MR. TAYLOR: Although if it's stipulated 
they're told to accept it. What I'm concerned 
about is the implication, which is falacious, that 
because of the diagnosis or the condition that I 
just described, it necessarily follows that she was 
violent — that A) she had a blackout on the 
morning of August 5th, and B) she was violent 1 
during that blackout. That does not follow from 
17CS 
1 that conclus. 
THE 
Counselor. 
MR. 
testify that 
ion or that diagnosis. 
COURT: I don't think it does 
MUSSELMAN: I don't think he 
it necessarily follows, but 
as I say, the opinion that he gives as to 
diagnosis and as to the 
THE 
MR. 
— 
COURT: He can give that. 
MUSSELMAN: 
diagnosis entails, what 
arriving at : 
-- and as to what 
his methodology e 
Lt, and explaining what that 
think the jury ought to 
assess the wait to give 
MR. 
I'm entitled 
that conclus: 
THE 
direction to 
Are 
MR. 
TAYLOR: If 
see and hear the 
it. 
# I 
can 1 
once again 
the 
that 
ntailed in 
means, I 
witness to 
it's limited to that and 
to cross to point out the fa 
Lon, I suppose that's okay. 
COURT: I think that's suffic 
both counsel. Let's call th 
there any other preliminary 
MUSSELMAN: 
five-minute recess 
(Short recess) 
MR. 
out. 
TAYLOR: We 
I think we need a 
need to bring Ms. 
(Jury returns to court room) 
llacy of 
ient 
e jury. 
matters? 
bout a 
Barney 
±(bd 
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ADDENDUM F 
Rules 4 01 and 4 03, Utah Rules of Evidence 
KUie 1VO U I A n itUL*c«0 v r u • iisctrixsE* - w w 
commission of crime similar to that presently 
charged, 50 A L R 4th 1049. 
Products liability: admissibility of evidence 
of absence of other accidents, 51 A.L.R.4th 
1186. 
Thermographic tests: admissibility of test re-
sults in personal injury suits, 56 A.L.R.4th 
1105. 
Criminal law: dog scent discrimination 
lineups, 63 A.L.R.4th 143. 
Products liability: admissibility of experi-
Advisory Committee No!/-, — This rule is 
the federal rule, verbatim, and is substantia 
comparable to Rule 45, Utah Rules of Evidence 
(1971) except that "surprise" is not included as 
a basis for exclusion of relevant evidence. The 
change in language is not one of substance, 
since "surprise" would be within the concept of 
"unfair prejudice" as contained in Rule 402 
{Rule 403). See also Advisory Committee Note 
to Federal Rule 403 indicating that ft contin-
uance in most instances would ; * * *n •? ap-
propriate method of dealing with "surprise.* 
See also Smith v. Estelle, 445 F. Supp. 647 
(N.D. Tex. 1977) (surprise use of psychiatric 
ANALYSIS 
Balancing tes t 
Bias. 
Circumstantial evidence. 
Credibility of witness. 
Cumulative evidence. 
Determination of admissibility. 
Expert testimony. 
Film of murder scene. 
Guilty plea. 
Harmless error. 
Impeachment of witness. 
Inflammatory evidence. 
Offensive remarks. 
Other offenses. 
Photographic evidence. 
Prior convictions. 
—Impeachment. 
Psychiatric history and drug abuse. 
Scientific evidence. 
Standard of review. 
Tape recordings. 
—Defendant's admissions. 
—Videotapes in pornography trial. 
Unfairly prejudicial. 
Victim's testimony. 
Cited. 
Balancing test. 
The balancing test of this rule excludes mat-
ter of scant or cumulative probative force, 
dragged in by the heels for the sake of its prej-
mental or test evidence to disprove defect in 
motor vehMe, 64 A.L R 4th 125. 
Admissibility, in criminal cases, of evidence 
of electrophoresis of dried evidentiary blood-
stains, 66 A.L.R.4th 588. 
Admissibility, in prosecution for sex-related 
offense, of results of tests on semen or seminal 
fluids, 75 A.L.R.4th 897. 
Admissibility of hypnotically refreshed or 
enhanced testimony, 77 A.L R.4th 927. 
Admissibility of DNA identification evi-
dence, 84 A L.R4th 313. 
testimony in capital case ruled prejudicial and 
viola* ion of duo process). See the following 
I'IVHI- *aes t<» •» same effect. Terry v. Zions 
Coop. Mercantile Inst., 605 P.2d 314 (Utah 
1979); State v. Johns, 615 P.2d 1260 (Utah 
1980); Reiser v. Lohner, 641 P.2d 93 (Utah 
1982). 
Compiler** Notes. — The bracketed refer-
ence to "Rule 403** in the Advisory Committee 
Note to Rule 403 was inserted because Rule 
402 does not refer to "unfair prejudice" and 
Rule 403 appears to be the correct reference. 
Cross-References. — Admissibility of evi-
dence, Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 43(a). 
udicial effect. State v. Bartley, 784 P.2d 1231 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Bias. 
The right to cross-examine regarding bias is 
limited by this rule. State v. Hackford, 737 
P.2d 200 (Utah 1987). 
Circumstantial evidence. 
rirnjraatantial evidence, although relevant, 
ttiHv -vertheless be excluded if the i <« 
of the evidence is more than count >d 
by its disadvantageous effects in c**«. he 
issues before the jury, or in creating an undue 
prejudice in excess of its legit imate probative 
weight. Terry v. Zions Coop. Mercantile Inst., 
605 P.2d 314 (Utah 1979), overruled on other 
grounds, McFarland v. Skaggs Cos., Inc., 678 
P.2d 298 (Utah 1984). 
Credibility of witness. 
This rule is not to be used to allow the trial 
judge to substitute his assessment of the credi-
bility of testimony for that of the jury by ex-
cluding testimony simply because he does not 
find it credible. State v. Branch, 743 P.2d 1187 
(Utah 1987), cert, denied, 485 U.S. 1036,108 S. 
Ct. 1597, 99 L. Ed. 2d 911 (1988). 
Cumulative evidence. 
While there may have been little reason to 
admit into evidence transcripts of recorded 
conversations between the defendant and a 
government informant because the evidence 
was cumulative, their admission was not preju-
Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of 
prejudice, confusion, or waste of time. 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is sub-
stantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the is-
sues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of 
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
dicial because the transcripts merely repeated 
the informant's in-court testimony. State v. 
Knowles, 709 P 2d 311 (Utah 1985). 
Determination of admissibility. 
Although the relevancy of proffered evidence 
is crucial, the probative value of the evidence, 
standing alone, does not determine its admissi-
bility. Terry v. Zions Coop. Mercantile Inst., 
605 P 2d 314 (Utah 1979), overruled on other 
grounds, McFarland v. Skaggs Cos., Inc., 678 
P.2d 298 (Utah 1984). 
At defendant's trial for forging an endorse-
ment on a check, where actual forgery had 
been committed by comf ion, blank checks 
found in defendant's car *tre admissible as ev-
idence to support an inference of defendant's 
knowledge of the fraud and intentional partici-
pation in the forgery; the probative value of 
the blank checks was not substantially out-
weighed by their potential prejudicial effect. 
State v. McCardell, 652 P.2d 942 >U**h 1982). 
In a drug product liability action there was 
no error in admitting inserts contained in drug 
packages, containing warnings of possible side 
effects, where the jury verdict finding negli-
gence was general, where the inserts had a 
minor role as cumulative evidence, and where 
the inserts were specifically admitted only for 
the purpose of proving defect under strict lia-
bility. Barson ex rel. Barson v. E.R. Squibb As 
Sons, 682 P.2d 832 (Utah 1984). 
Where in a trial for murder, robbery, and 
theft, evidence of the defendant's probation vi-
olation and the theft of a wallet established the 
defendant's motive and identity, which were 
critical facts in a case that was built primarily 
on circumstantial evidence, the evidence was 
highly probative and outweighed the risk of 
undue prejudice. Therefore, there was no abuse 
of the trial court's discretion in not excluding 
the evidence. State v. Shaffer, 725 P 2d 1301 
(Utah 1986). 
Police department letter revealing the out-
come of an internal investigation of a police 
officer was admissible, where the relevance of 
the letter outweighed the policy arguments 
against admission *»»' *««v danger of unfair 
prejudice, particult light of the city's 
ability to request a ' q; instruction and to 
present rebuttal testm *my. Meyers v. Salt 
Lake City Corp., 747 P.2d 1058 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988). 
The admissibility of character evidence of a 
victim's prior sexual behavior should be deter-
mined by the trial judge upon consideration of 
various factors, including (a) relevancy and 
probative value; (b) prejudicial effect; (c) confu-
sion of the issues and undue consumption of 
time; and (d) substantial justice. State v. 
Moton, 749 P.2d 639 (Utah 1988). 
Although trial courts should seriously con-
sider offers to stipulate in deciding whether to 
admit or exclude evidence pursuant to this 
rule, such an offer is only one factor that plays 
into the balancing process. State v. Bishop, 753 
P 2d 439 (Utah 1988). 
Trial court did not abuse its discretion in ad-
mitting evidence of a murder victim's hearsay 
statement that defendant had recently threat-
ened to kill her, where the victim's state of 
mind was put directly into issue by defendant's 
testimony, and the hearsay statement was 
highly probative on that issue. State v. Auble, 
754 P.2d 935 (Utah 1988). 
Even under circumstances where evidence of 
specific instances of defendant's conduct are al-
lowed under the rules, the trial court should 
analyze thip testimony under this rule. A care-
ful weighing of the relevance and probative 
value of such evidence should be made and a 
balance struck between the need for its intro-
duction and the prejudicial effect the testimony 
may have before such evidence is received. 
State v. Lenaburg. 781 P.2d 432 (Utah 1989). 
Expert testimony. 
In prosecution for aggravated sexual assault, 
testimony of expert in forensic pathology, as to 
whether victim sustained bodily injury creat-
ing a substantial risk of death, was properly 
admitted and did not create a substantial dan-
ger of confusing the issues and misleading the 
jury. State v. King, 604 P.2d 923 (Utah 1979). 
In a prosecution for sexually abusing a child, 
the judge's decision to exclude relevant expert 
testimony about the behavioral and personal-
ity characteristics of a "typical" child sexual 
offender was not arbitrary or irrational, since 
the tendency of such evidence to confuse the 
issues or mislead the jury outweighed its pro-
bative value. State v. Miller, 709 P.2d 350 
(Utah 1985). 
Expert testimony of medical examiner and 
investigator that the nature of victim's wounds 
was more consistent with homicide than with 
suicide was not plain *rror and did not violate 
this rule, Rule 40<* ;)e 702. State v. Quas, 
837 P.2d 565 (U* * App. 1992). 
Film of murder scene. 
Trial judge did not abuse his discretion in 
allowing the jury to view a film of the murder 
scene since it did not attempt to reenact the 
crime and was not inflammatory or prejudicial 
to the defendant. State v. Brown, 607 P.2d 261 
(Utah 1980). 
Guilty plea. 
Trial court abused its discretion in excluding 
defendant's guilty plea to a criminal charge 
from admission at a subsequent civil trial 
where plaintiffs wished to have the plea admit-
ted as a declaration against interest, the facts 
and circumstances surrounding the criminal 
charge were identical to the facts in the civil 
case, and no substantial time or confusion 
would have been added to the civil trial by rea-
son of admission of the guilty plea. Dixon v. 
Stewart, 658 P.2d 591 (Utah 1982). 
Because of the defendant's and the victim's 
conflicting testimony on whether the defen-
dant's intent was to rob the victim or merely to 
secure payment of money the defendant be-
lieved he was owed, the testimony concerning a 
prior robbery to which the defendant pled 
guilty, although clearly prejudicial to the de-
fendant, was extremely probative of the defen-
dant's intent during this incident. The trial 
court did not abuse its discretion in weighing 
these factors and determining that the proba-
tive value of the earlier guilty plea substan-
tially outweighed the prejudicial effect. State 
v. Morrell, 803 P.2d 292 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
Subdivision (b) is comparable in substance to promulgated by the United States Supreme 
Rule 15, Utah Rules of Evidence (1971). Utah Court. See Presumptions in Utah: A Search for 
law is believed to generally follow the position Certainty, 5 Utah L. Rev. 196 (1956). 
taken by the Uniform Rules of Evidence (1974) Cross-References. — Criminal proceed-
and the provisions of Article III as originally ings, presumption of fact in, § 76-1-503. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS Presumption upheld. 
Presumption not raised. Where mother executed will and trust in-
Presumption upheld. strument, and it was later found that the will 
Presumption not raised. had been executed as a result of undue influ-
Payment of portion of profits to defendant as ence, there was a prima facie presumption of 
partial reimbursement for expenditures of de- continued undue influence with respect to an 
fendant in connection with business premises
 aneged subsequent ratification of the trust, 
did not raise presumption of a partnership, and Robertson v. Campbell, 674 P.2d 1226 (Utah 
nloinhfl UIOB ronmrixl tn moot hio Hut-Hart nf r * 1983). p a ti f was equi ed o ee  s b rden o  proof without aid of presumption. Koesling v. 
Basamakis, 539 P.2d 1043 (Utah 1975). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Utah Rules of Evi- tification of land on which property taxes were 
dence 1983, 1985 Utah L. Rev. 63, 75. paid to establish adverse possession, 36 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 29 Am. Jur. 2d Evidence A.L R 4th 843. 
§§ 159 to 1&5, 167. Applicability of res ipsa loquitur in case of 
C.J.S. — 31A CJ.S. Evidence ft 119. multiple, nonmedical defendants—modern sta-
A.L.R. — Effect of presumption as evidence £Ug 59 A L R 4th 201 
or upon burden of proof where controverting Medical malpractice: presumption or infer-
evidence is introduced. 6 A.L R.3d 19.
 e n c e f r o m f a j | u r e rf h i t a , o r 6oclm to 
Refusal of defendant m pubhc figure l.bel
 d u c e re,evant ^ ^ ^ ^ 6 9 A X R"4th 
case to identify claimed sources as raising pre- Q ^ 
sumption against existence of source, 19 
906. 
ALR4th 919 e y Numbers. — Criminal Law •» 305, 
Presumptions and evidence respecting iden- 326» Evidence «» 85 et seq. 
Rule 302. Applicability of federal law in civil actions and 
proceedings. 
In civil action.H and proceedings, the effect of a presumption respecting a fact 
which is an element of a claim or defense as to which federal law supplies the 
rule of decision is determined in accordance with federal law. 
Advisory Committee Note. — The text of criminal cases are not treated in this rule. See 
this rule is token from Rule 302, Uniform Utah Code Annotated, Section 76-1-503 (1953) 
Rules of Evidence (1974). Presumptions in or any subsequent revision of that section. 
ARTICLE IV. 
RELEVANCY AND ITS LIMITS. 
Rule 401. Definition of "relevant evidence." 
'*!?<>)«'vnnt evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make the exis-
tence oi any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more 
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. 
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is prove or disprove the existence of any "mate-
the federal rule, verbatim, and is comparable rial fact." Avoiding the use of the term "mate-
in substance to Rule 1(2), Utah Rules of Evi- rial fact" accords with the application given to 
dence (1971), but the former rule defined rele- former Rule 1(2) by the Utah Supreme Court, 
vant evidence as that having a tendency to State v. Peterson, 560 P.2d 1387 (Utah 1977). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS (Utah 1979), overruled on other grounds, 
Effect of remoteness. McFarland v. Skaggs Cos., Inc., 678 P.2d 298 
Cited. <u t a h 1984> 
Effect of remoteness. Cited in State v. Gray, 717 P.2d 1313 (Utah 
Remoteness usually goes to the weight of the 1986); State v. Nickles, 728 P.2d 123 (Utah 
evidence and not its admissibility. Terry v. 1986); Meyers v. Salt Lake City Corp., 747 
Zions Coop. Mercantile Inst., 605 P.2d 314 P.2d 1058 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); Fisher ex ret 
Fisher v. Trapp, 748 P.2d 204 (Utah Ct. App. P.2d 532 (Utah Ct App 1989) WhitPh^H v 
1988); Belden v. Dalbo, Inc., 752 P.2d 1317 American Motor* SaieT Co^^ 8 ^ P 2d 920 
(Utah Ct. ADD. 1988): St-t* „ W„^K„„ •?«* /in^u *«r^ ^ . ~ ^ O U 1 r Z d y z u ( t  t. pp. ); tate v. orthen, 765 
P.2d 839 (Utah 1988); State v. Maurer, 770 
P.2d 981 (Utah 1989); State, In re R.D.S., 777 
(Utah 1990); State v. Pascual, 804 P.2d 553 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991); State v. Larsen, 828 P 2d 
487 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Evidence and the Rejection of Frye, 1986 Utah 
L. Rev. 839. 
Utah Law Review Utah Rules of Evi-
dence 1983, 1985 Utah L. Rev. 63, 78. 
United States v. Downing: Novel Scientific 
Rule 402. Relevant evidence generally admissible; irrele-
vant evidence inadmissible. 
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the 
Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the state of Utah, 
statute, or by these rules, or by other rules applicable in courts of this state. 
Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible. 
Advisory Committee Note. — The text of 
this rule is Rule 402, Uniform Rules of Evi-
dence (1974) except that prior to the word 
"statute" the words "Constitution of the United 
States" have been added. 
Compiler's Note*. — The Utah rule also 
adds the words "or the Constitution of the state 
of Utah" to Rule 402, Uniform Rules of Evi-
dence (1974). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALY8I8 
Discretion of court. 
Effect of remoteness. 
Irrelevant evidence. 
Probability evidence. 
Scientific evidence. 
Standard of review. 
Cited. 
Discretion of court. 
The trial court is given considerable discre-
tion in deciding whether or not evidence sub-
mitted is relevant. Bambrough v. Bethera, 552 
P2d 1286 (Utah 1976). 
While relevant evidence is generally admis-
sible,
 a trial court has broad discretion to de-
termine whether proffered evidence is rele-
vant, and the appellate court will find error in 
a relevancy ruling only if the trial court hss 
•bused its discretion. State v. Harrison, 80a 
P 2d 769 (Utah Ct. App), cert, denied, 817 P.2d 
327 (Utah 1991). 
Effect of remoteness. 
Remoteness usually goes to the weight of the 
evidence and not its admissibility. Terry v. 
Zions Coop. Mercantile Inst., 605 P.2d 314 ( i i^h 1 9 7 9 ) ' o v e r r u ,«d on other grounds, 
McFarland v. Skaggs Cos., Inc., 678 P.2d 298 
<Utah 1984). 
Irrelevant evidence. 
Testimony as to impulsiveness of another 
Participant in the crime had no bearing on de-
fendant's guilt or innocence and was properly 
excluded as not relevant to defendant's partici-
pation in the crime. State v. Stephens, 667 
P.2d 586 (Utah 1983). 
Probability evidence. 
Courts have routinely excluded probability 
evidence when the evidence invites the jury to 
focus upon a seemingly scientific, numerical 
conclusion rather than to analyze the evidence 
before it and decide where truth lies. State v. 
Rammel, 721 P.2d 498 (Utah 1986). 
Scientific evidence. 
The Frye test (that scientific tests still in the 
experimental stages should not be admitted in 
evidence, but that scientific testimony deduced 
from a well recognized scientific principle or 
discovery is admissible if the scientific princi-
ple is sufficiently established) is a valid test, 
though not necessarily an exclusive test, for 
rictermining when scientific evidence is suffi-
ciently reliable to be admitted and is not incon-
sistent with Rules 402, 403, and 702 of the 
Utah Rules of Evidence. KoiTord v. Flora, 744 
P.2d 1343 (Utah 1987). 
Standard of review. 
The judgment of the trial court admitting or 
excluding evidence will not be reversed unless 
it is shown that the discretion exercised 
therein has been abused. Terry v. Zions Coop. 
Mercantile Inst, 605 P 2d 314 (Utah 1979), 
overruled on other grounds, McFarland v. 
Skaggs Cos., Inc., 678 P.2d 298 (Utah 1984). 
Cited in State v. Larsen, 828 P.2d 487 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1992). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — United States v. 
"owning: Novel Scientific Evidence and the 
"ejection of Frye, 1986 Utah L. Rev. 839. 
Note, Establishing Paternity Through HLA 
iS;In.g: U t a h Standards for Admissibility, 
1988 Utah L. Rev. 717. 
A.L.R. — Admissibility of voice stress evalu-
ation test results or of statements made during 
test, 47 A.L.R.4th 1202. 
Admissibility and weight of evidence of prior 
misidentification of accused in connection with 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OP UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GERALD GENE BLUBAUGH, 
Defendant(s)• 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ON 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
SUPPRESS 
Case No. 921400519 FS 
Judge Lynn W. Davis 
This matter came before the Court on the Defendant's Motion to 
Suppress* The Court has issued its Ruling dated May 18, 1993. 
Being fully advised in the premises the Court makes and enters the 
following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On August 5, 1992, Dee Rosenbaum, Chief of the Spanish 
Fork Police Department, received a call to go to the apartment 
shared by Defendant, Gerald Gene Blubaugh, and co-Defendant, 
Christy Barney, to investigate a possible non-accidental injury to 
the victim, Faith Barney. 
2. When Chief Rosenbaum arrived at Defendant's residence the 
Defendant was in his car and leaving for the hospital. 
3. Chief Rosenbaum was driving an unmarked automobile and was 
410 
in plain clothes. The Chief was not displaying a badge nor was he 
armed. 
4. The Defendant, Gerald Blubaugh, recognized Chief Rosenbaum 
and stopped to talk to him. 
5. After a brief conversation outside the apartment Chief 
Rosenbaum asked for permission to enter the home, view the crib, 
and take the crib sheet. 
6. Defendant, Gerald Blubaugh, was advised that Chief 
Rosenbaum's purpose in seizing the sheet was to preserve evidence 
in the event fluids on the sheet needed to be analyzed. 
7. The Defendant agreed to the entry of Chief Rosenbaum into 
his home and the seizure of the sheet. 
8. Chief Rosenbaum did not claim to have authority to search 
the apartment absent consent. 
9. The extent of Chief Rosenbaum's intrusion into the home on 
this first instance was to speak to Defendant, Gerald Blubaugh, 
view the crib, and seize the crib sheet. 
10. Chief Rosenbaum did not display any show of force. 
11. The Defendant cooperated with Chief Rosenbaum and freely 
and voluntarily gave the Chief consent to enter the home, view the 
crib and take the sheet. 
12. Chief Rosenbaum spoke to the Defendant, Gerald Blubaugh, 
and co-Defendant, Christy Barney, again at the hospital in Payson 
on the morning of August 5, 1992. After leaving the hospital all 
three agreed to meet again at the Blubaugh apartment. 
13. When Chief Rosenbaum arrived at the apartment he was 
2 
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invited inside. 
14. Chief Rosenbaum had brought a video camera with him and 
asked for permission to videotape the apartment. 
15. Both Christy Barney and Defendant, Gerald Blubaugh, 
agreed to have the apartment videotaped. 
16. Chief Rosenbaum panned around the apartment and focused 
briefly on the crib and on some prescriptions for the child. 
17. The Defendants cooperated with Chief Rosenbaum's efforts 
by holding up prescriptions and showing him through the apartment. 
18. Chief Rosenbaum did not make a claim of authority to 
search the apartment absent a warrant or a consent. 
19. Chief Rosenbaum did not make any exhibition of force. 
20. Chief Rosenbaum merely requested permission to videotape 
the apartment and limited his search to the scope of his request. 
21. Chief Rosenbaum did not act deceptively. 
22. Chief Rosenbaum did not tell the Defendant, Gerald Gene 
Blubaugh, that he had the right to refuse to have the apartment 
videotaped. 
23. Co-Defendant, Christy Barney, voluntarily consented to 
the videotaping of the home. 
24. The meeting was not confrontational or accusatory. 
25. The focus of the interviews conducted by Chief Rosenbaum 
of Gerald Gene Blubaugh on August 5, 1992, at the Defendant's 
apartment was not on the Defendant but on the cause of the victim's 
injury in an attempt to discover who the caretakers of the child 
3 
were for the purpose of preserving evidence. 
26. The questions were not directed at any specific person. 
27. There was no objective indicia of arrest, no handcuffs 
were visible, no threat of arrest was made, and no uniformed 
officers were present. 
28. The length of both interviews was short in duration and 
Chief Rosenbaum did not use coercive or compulsive strategy. 
29 • The interview at Payson Hospital with both Defendants 
occurred in the public lobby area of the emergency room. 
30. Other persons, including the best friend of Christy 
Barney, were present. 
31. Hospital patrons were coming and going. 
32. The questions asked were generic and were not coercive in 
nature and were not directed to one specific Defendant. 
33. The Defendants and Chief Rosenbaum mutually agreed to the 
next meeting at the home after leaving the hospital. 
34. Chief Rosenbaum arrived at the home in Spanish Fork 
before the Defendants. 
35. The Defendants were not escorted home and had stopped for 
sodas on the way home suggesting that they were not compelled to 
arrive at the home at any particular time or to conduct an 
interview. 
36. Co-Defendant Barney stated that she never felt under 
arrest and freely assisted Chief Rosenbaum in the interview and 
taking the video. 
37. Neither Defendant was in custody at any time on August 5f 
4 
1992, for purposes of Miranda warnings. 
38. On August 14, 1992, the Defendant, Gerald Gene Blubaugh, 
was interviewed by Spanish Fork Police Officers at the Spanish Fork 
Police Department. 
39. The interview occurred at the Spanish Fork Police 
Department in the evening. 
40. Officer Steve Adams went to the Defendant's apartment and 
asked the Defendant if he would come to the police department to be 
questioned. 
41. Officer Adams was clothed in a suit and tie. 
42. Defendant, Gerald Blubaugh, agreed to accompany the 
officer and went to the station in the officer's car. 
43. Blubaugh's car had broken down and was upon blocks. 
44. Defendant, Gerald Blubaugh, was not placed under arrest 
and was not handcuffed. 
45. The police station was a converted IHC Instacare facility 
(doctors office) which did not have the appearance of a jail or 
holding cell. 
46. Once at the station the Defendant was taken to an 
interview room. 
47. Officer Adams left and Lt. Carl Johnston entered the 
interview room. 
48. Lt. Johnston was also in a suit and tie. 
49. No questions were asked of the Defendant until 
approximately ten minutes later when Officer Adams returned. 
Officer Johnston recited Miranda warnings to the Defendant before 
5 
any further questioning. 
50. Defendant, Gerald Blubaugh, agreed to speak with officers 
and was questioned for approximately an hour. 
51 • After the initial questioning the tape recorder was 
turned on and Defendant Blubaugh was again given his Miranda 
rights. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact the Court makes and enters 
the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Defendant voluntarily consented to the seizure of the 
crib sheet on August 5, 1992. 
2. The Defendant, as well as the co-Defendant, voluntarily 
consented to the videotaping of the apartment on August 5, 1992. 
3. The Defendant was not in custody for purpose of Miranda 
warnings during the August 5, 1992, interviews with Chief 
Rosenbaum. 
4. Any statements made by the Defendant on August 14, 1992, 
at the Spanish Fork Police Department were made following adequate 
Miranda warnings. ^< "^TT""" 
DATED this & * day of May, 1993. 
BY THE COURT/: 
'LYNN W. DAVIS \\o>. >?-
DISTRICT JUDGE v : ' " X. > 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
6 
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Findgings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on Defendant's Motion to 
Suppress were faxed and mailed this &1 day of May, 1993, to: 
Linda Anderson, Attorney for Defendant, 2230 North University 
Parkway, Suite 9-F, Provo, Utah, 84604; fax no. 801-375-0704, and 
John Musselman, Attorney for Defendant, 3507 North University 
Avenue, Suite 370, Provo, Utah, 84604; fax no. 801-375-7686. 
7 
FILED 
Fourth Jiui,.:,z- '+-;. >• Cwt of 
CTHwk^MilH.Cierk 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT QO j( J Deputy 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF UTAH, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
GERALD G. BLUBAUGH, j 
Defendant. 
RULING ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
TO SUPPRESS 
Case No. 921400519 
Judge Lynn W. Davis 
This matter came before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Su^:.~~. The Court 
has reviewed the memoranda of counsel, took testimony, entertained argument of counsel, 
and being fully advised in the premises, now enters the following: 
RULING 
1. The defendant voluntarily consented to the seizure of the crib sheet. 
2. The defendant as well as the co-defendant voluntarily consented to the video 
taping of the apartment. 
3. The defendant was not in custody for purpose of Miranda during the August 5, 
1992 interviews with Chief Rosenbaum. 
4. Assuming without deciding that the defendant was in custody while at the 
Spanish Fork Police Station, the defendant received adequate Miranda 
warnings during the August 14, 1992 interrogation. 
DISCUSSION 
L VOLUNTARY CONSENT 
The defendant requests that this Court suppress certain evidence seized without a 
warrant from the defendant's home; namely, a crib sheet and a video-tape of the defendant's 
apartment made by police on August 5, 1992. Defendant argues that this evidence should be 
suppressed because it was obtained without a warrant and there is no valid exception to the 
warrant requirement. The defendant challenges the voluntariness of the consent given. The 
defendant argues that although he consented, he subjectively felt that he could not refuse 
consent because of Chief Rosenbaum's position as chief of police. Consequently, the 
defendant argues that since he did not think that he could refuse, that his consent was not 
voluntary. 
Voluntary consent is an established exception to the warrant requirement. 
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte. 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973); State v. Arrovo. 796 P.2d 684, 687 
(Utah 1990); State v. Vigil, 815 P.2d 1296, 1301 (Utah App. 1991). In order for a court to 
admit evidence seized without a warrant the state must prove that: (1) the consent was 
voluntary in fact; and (2) the consent was not obtained by police exploitation of a prior 
illegality. Arroyo. 796 P.2d at 688. Since the defendant has not alleged any prior illegality, 
the second prong is not at issue. 
The determination of voluntariness is an inherently fact sensitive inquiry and requires 
inquiry into the totality of the circumstances. State v. Carter. 812 P.2d 460, 467 (Utah App. 
1991); State v. Marshall. 791 P.2d 880, 887 (Utah App. 1991); State v. Webb. 790 P.2d 65, 
82 (Utah App. 1990). The state must meet the following standard: 
(1) There must be clear and positive testimony that the consent was 
2 
"unequivocal and specific" and "freely and intelligently given;" (2) the 
government must prove consent was given without duress or coercion, express 
or implied; and (3) the court indulge every reasonable presumption against the 
waiver of fundamental constitutional rights and there must be convincing 
evidence that such rights were waived. 
791 P.2d 880, 887-88 (quoting United States v. Abbott. 546 F.2d 883, 885 i ; 
.._ . HI 1 ."" Il -I " 
The Utah Suprenn ft iiiiirt has listed some factors which trial courts can take into 
consideration '*hi'i> delenn iinig v1!'.*!!1/1! '.oi'vti, w.t!"i VP'M J ,', Fit |III||!,|!||II "I1 '' *tlinv |'|«," i 
claim of authority to search by the officers; (2) the absence of an exhibition of torce- by tne 
officers; (3) a mere request to search; (4) cooperation by the u.-nt'i iuJ l, 
deception or trick on the part of the officer," State v. Whittenback. 621 P.lti 103 . •>' • 
(Uun 1980); Carter. Si? P ?;? at 467-68. A™fher factor to be considered is whein- ~.e 
defen- Whittenback. 621 P.2d at 106, But this last 
:s not deir * u . _ e is not required to prove that the defendant knew 
.il Hi-!1 figiii Li . J . . . '. I. i I I..II I I . I I ,M7. Whittc,»baik. f>'"1 I1 ?.l M iltf. J l a r t o , 
812 P,2d at 468; Bobo. 803 P.2d at 1272. 
w*w *u-vi. -^t>M standard to ^uidajin, lln, 
seizure issues raised by defendant concerning the crib sheet and the video-taping of the 
apartment. 
; : leizure of the Crib Sheet, 
On August 5, 1992, Dee Rosenbaum, chief of the Spanish Fork Police Department, 
3 
received a call to go to the apartment shared by the defendant and Christy Barney to 
investigate a possible "non-accidental" injury to the victim, Faith Barney, When Chief 
Rosenbaum arrived at the defendant's residence, the defendant was in his car and leaving for 
the hospital. Chief Rosenbaum was driving an unmarked automobile and was in plain 
clothes. He was not displaying a badge, nor was he wearing a gun. The defendant 
recognized Chief Rosenbaum and stopped to talk to him. Chief Rosenbaum identified 
himself. 
After a brief conversation outside the apartment, the officer asked for permission to 
enter the home, view the crib, and take the crib sheet. Chief Rosenbaum stated that his 
purpose in seizing the sheet was to preserve evidence in the event the fluids on the sheet 
needed to be analyzed. The defendant was advised of these purposes. The defendant also 
agreed to the entry of Chief Rosenbaum into his home and the seizure of the sheet. Chief 
Rosenbaum did not document or record any statements of the defendant. 
The Court makes the following findings regarding the facts surrounding the seizure of 
the crib sheets: The officer asked specifically for permission to look at the crib and take the 
crib sheet; the officer limited the scope of his search and seizure to the specific items he 
requested to see and seize; the officer did not claim to have authority to search the apartment 
absent consent; the officer did not display any show of force, and there was no evidence of 
any coercion. Chief Rosenbaum did not wear a gun and was not in uniform; the officer 
merely requested consent to view the crib and take the sheet; the defendant cooperated with 
4 
tint i Hi In H ill! fTiuTT did not attempt to deceive the defendant regarding his purpose for 'the 
search; the defendant was not in custody; the officer did not tell the defence that he had a 
Th^rp k no pvidp.ncf thnt the discussion was confrontational or 
accusatory in nature 
"ill!!, "( Vim "ili'lfMiiiiii ,„, iillni lUiLsideiliig ll'ii loliih'v ", "I1" 'l"1'"1"1 ,l|pstnnre.sl that the 
LwxwA4v*jjit voluntarily consented to the request to view 
also determines that the del aidant's conser, - 1 
intelligently given/ 
P Video-taping of Apartment 
:
* ftiubaugh and Christy Barney agreed to meet with Chief 
Rosenbaum at 11 V) a r- on August i , 1992. 'Ihe meeting was held at their apartment. • 
When Clue) Kusefihumn iiinvnl .il Hit1, apart rnrril, lif1" w m in .ilnl ni'.irlr1 Chief Rosenbaum 
had brought a video camera with him and asked for permission to video-tape the apartment. 
11 , 11 (" 1111: * I, y Barney and . . „.. ~~ - . . ~
 c fc 
panned around the apartment and focused briefly M th* , e prescriptions for 
the child. The defendants cooperated .v.^osenDaun ..; 
prescriptions. , and showing him through the apanment. 
The Court makes the following factual findings regarding the video-taping of the 
authority to search the apartment absent a 
warrant or consent; (2) there was no exhibition of force; (3) the officer merely requested 
5 
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permission to video-tape the apartment and limited his search to the scope of his request; (4) 
the defendant and Christy Barney, the co-defendant, cooperated and assisted the officer's 
video-taping; (5) the officer did not act deceptively; (6) the officer did not tell defendant that 
he had the right to refuse; (7) Christy Barney also voluntarily consented the video-taping of 
the home. The meeting was not confrontational nor accusatory. Viewing the totality of the 
circumstances surrounding the consent to video-tape the apartment, the Court determines that 
the defendant's consent was voluntary, "unequivocal and specific," and "freely and 
intelligently given." 
H. MIRANDA CONSIDERATIONS 
The defendant argues that the state failed to provide the defendant with a Miranda 
warning prior to interrogating him on three occasions. There is no dispute before this Court 
that the defendant was questioned on at least three occasions. Chief Rosenbaum interviewed 
the defendant twice at his apartment on August 5, 1992. And on August 14, 1992, two 
officers of the Spanish Fork Police interviewed defendant at the police station. 
The protection afforded in Miranda are triggered only when the defendant is subject 
to custodial interrogation. State v. Mirquet. 844 P.2d 995 (Utah App. 1992). The United 
States Supreme Court has defined custodial interrogation as "questioning initiated by law 
enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his 
freedom in any significant way." Miranda v. Arizona. 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). The 
Court has also stated that the "ultimate inquiry is simply whether there is a 'formal arrest or 
6 
restrain! of freedom in mo • ninii nil iln depree associated with formal arrest." California 
v. Beheler. 465 U . S . 1121, 1125 (1983). The inquiry is objective: whether a reasonable 
•,t defendain'v p s||||i»11111 w i'i k h ' •'"" '' her freedom, w as. curtailed to a degree 
— w ~ ed with a formal arrest. State v. Mirquet. 844 P.2d at 999 . 
The court, ul appi ill1 III w identified five latUus lo lit i misideicil IIII i g 
the defendant was in custody for purposes of Miranda: (1) the site of 'the 
interrogation; (2) whether the investigation focused on the accused; (3) whether \ 
i nil ii h\ of .iiTtM wi iii i in if M ul, .annul («i) the length and form of interrogation; (5) the presence 
of coercive or compulsive strategy on the officer part, ,M 
A. August 5th. 1992. 
The defendant seeks to have any incriminating statements made during the two 
interviews made on Au^uu V I W al \\i\ aptiilmriil suppressed Mi I limn! iiiriiih,li 
following factual findings with regards to the1 August S, 1992, interviews: The site of the 
interviews was defendant's apartment; the locus at tin "  iiiiiiiilr'i iews was not on the L„£; .^ . . t 
cause of the child 's Injury, discovering who 'the caretakers of the child were, and 
preserving evidence; the questions were not directed at any specific person; there were nrk 
, no handcuffs weinr visible, no threat of arrest was made, nu 
uniformed officers were present; the officer was invited into the home; the lengths of both 
interviews were short in duration; ll > office did III»I i < « i i» ipi/i<;ivih. strategy. 
The second "interview" at the home occurred after Chief Rosenbaum had a short discussion 
7 
at the Payson hospital with both defendants. That discussion occurred in the public lobby 
area of the emergency room. Others were present, including the best friend of Christy 
Barney. Other hospital patrons were coming and going. The questions were generic, were 
not coercive in nature and were not directed to one specific defendant. The defendants and 
Chief Rosenbaum arranged the next meeting at the home at that time. Chief Rosenbaum 
arrived back at the home before the defendants. They were not escorted home and had 
stopped for sodas on the way home, suggesting that they were not compelled to arrive at the 
home at any particular time or to conduct an interview. Co-Defendant Barney, who shared 
the residence, admitted that she never felt under arrest and freely assisted Chief Rosenbaum 
in taking the video. 
These facts amply support the Court's determination that for purposes of Miranda the 
defendant was not in custody. A reasonable person in the defendant's situation would not 
consider him or herself in custody or under formal arrest. 
& August 14th. 1992 
The facts surrounding the August 14, 1992 interview are significantly different and 
are not in dispute with one exception. The relevant undisputed facts are as follows. The 
interview occurred at the Spanish Fork Police Station in the evening. Officer Steve Adams 
went to the defendant's apartment and asked the defendant if he would come the police 
station with him in order to ask him some questions. Officer Adams was clothed in a suit 
and tie. Defendant Blubaugh agreed to accompany the officer and went to the station in the 
8 
officer's car. Blubaugh's car had broken down and was up on blocks. The defendant was 
not placed under arrest and was not handcuffal i i r .JII ilii iiauou, ilir, ildniiLtiii m tis iala;n 
to the interview room. Officer Adams left and Lt. Carl Johnson entered the interview room. 
*' Tohnson was also in a suit and tie, The Spanish Fork police department at that 
in >\ biiilrinic previously usrd as a I .H.C. InstaCare facility. It was not a jail 
environment. ^re asked at this time ASout fen minutes later officer Adams 
return lefendant and the state 
m e detenaan. . t ^ . . ceded to 
ask him questions. Defendant alleges that the officers used a "good cop/bad cop" technique 
during this part of the interview After an hour the officers began tape reooiuing uie 
interrogation fohnson then recited the Miranda warning for the first time. The 
w continued for around another hour. 
Johnson recited the 
Miranda warning to .\e c- .
 Muestioning occurred. I lin : officers testified 
that they did quest 
beginning recording the interview, recited the Miranda warning again 
9 
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officers testified that the purpose for not taping the interview at the onset was to focus the 
scope of the interview: separating the wheat from the chaff in Officer Johnson's words. 
After considering the testimony, the Court finds the testimony of the two officers to 
be more credible and finds that the defendant did receive proper Miranda warnings prior to 
the interrogation. The Court will not reach the issue of whether the defendant was in 
custody during the interrogation at the Spanish Fork Police station because it finds that 
proper Miranda warnings were given. 
CONCLUSION 
Counsel for plaintiff is to prepare Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and an 
Order within 15 days of this decision consistent with the terms of this Ruling and submit it to 
opposing counsel for approval as to form prior to submission to the Court for signature. 
This Ruling has no effect until such Order is signed by the Court. 
Dated at Provo, this [& day of _ M&</ . 1993. 
BY THE COURT 
cc: Linda Anderson, Esq. 
John Musselman, Esq. 
Jim Taylor, Esq. 
10 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DlSTRK I I ( M III I 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF UTAH, STATE OF UTAH 
FILED 
*,v..*tr, jKfc j i i ^ 4 ' r ' c t C{K j r t o1 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
GERALD G. BLUBAUGH, 
Defendant. 
RULING ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
IN LIMINE AND DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO QUASH AND MOTION 
TO DISMISS 
Case No. 921400519 
Judge Lynn W. Davis 
This matter came before the Court on May 25, 1993 on Defendant's Motion in 
Limine and Defendant's Motion to Quash and Motion In I >i\ I In defendant filed 
numerous motions on May 1, 1993. The state responded on May 21, 1993. The Court has 
reviewed the file, considered the memoranda of counsel, entertained argument of counsel, 
lie l» t ii fully iulviMtl in Hit premises now enters the following: 
RULING 
1. Di'lViulaiil'*" "'niiini in lnim inim.hn ||M|i nf uiinjny pin.pIJIJ;1p|1s imt] vidtvfape 
recordings of photographic depictions of the victim is granted. 
Jm • D CI ei iGcLTl i ji I K i I, i i i ii mi mi i 1 1 mi in I mi 1 1 , t % 1 1 II ii iii II 1 1 in III • in mi mi mi in iii 1 1 iii,, %. % if mi in 1 1 1 1 1 K , II j „ > t ' , a i mi \ 1 1 1 i " I ii, "iT 
drug counseling is granted. 
3. Defendant's motion to limit introduction of evidence of sexual abuse sustained 
inflicted by the defendant early in. his life is granted, 
4. Dei i I l l s motion to limit introduction of evidence of attempts by defendant 
to restrain the victim through use of a harness is granted. 
5. Defendant's motion to limit introduction of the videotape recording of 
defendant's home is denied. 
6. Defendant's motion to limit the introduction of testimony demonstrating 
defendant's knowledge of karate is denied. 
7. The Court reserves ruling on defendant's motion to limit the introduction of 
evidence of pattern of abuse and battered child syndrome. 
8. Defendant's Motion to Quash the bindover and Motion to Dismiss are denied. 
DISCUSSION 
I. 
MOTION IN LIMINE 
The Court grants defendant's Motion in Limine as to the following items: autopsy 
photographs, videotaped depiction of victim prior to death, evidence of prior drug use, 
evidence of prior sexual abuse suffered by defendant or inflicted by defendant, and evidence 
that defendant restrained the victim in a harness. The plaintiff has not opposed limiting the 
introduction of the above listed items. 
The Court denies defendant's motion with regards to the videotape recording of 
defendant's home and evidence of defendant's karate training. The Court finds that this 
evidence is relevant and upon the proper foundation is admissible. The Court finds that any 
prejudice to the defendant does not substantially outweigh the probative value of the 
2 
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pi offered evidence • •; 
The Court reserves ruling on the admissibility of a specific pattern of abuse. The 
( omul l i iuds Hull1 lliiiii iiviiLltitntf iiiiiiiy In mi HI; Hi, vjiiiil mil |K . I I I I I I^> HIIIIII H I ruah l iM imei i i nf mi |Mnjxfcr 
foundation. 
n 
MOTION TO QUASH AND MOTION TO DISMISS 
The Court has reviewed the preliminary hearing transcript li i ;:  clei foi tl ic state to 
pre \ ra il at prelin lina i ) 1 ica i In :ig tl me s t a t e i i in ist present evidence establishing probable cause 
under two separate prongs: (1) that a crime has been committed, and (2) that there is 
Anderson. 612 P 2d 778, 782-83 (Utah 1980). 
The defendant does not content Hut tic su i t has lailnl I
 rin,, 11 •. iLil a u.ii.iL has 
been committed. Rather, defendant challenges the probable cause determination underlying 
the second prong. Evidence of battered child syndrome alone is not enough to prove that the 
defend.ml rommillnl titr plinviv win 1 mch testimony is "not accusatory, but only indicates 
the cause of death." State v. Tanner. 675 P.2d 539, 542 (Utah 1983). The defendant argues 
nng supn 
probable cause that the defendant committed the offense. 
order. The Court makes the following findings which support the bindover order: There is 
3 
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sufficient evidence to conclude that the defendant had care and custody of the victim jointly 
with Christy Barney. Specifically, the defendant was present in the home the evening prior 
to the child's hospitalization. Additionally, there is evidence that the defendant was the first 
person to awake the morning of August 5,1992, and alerted Christy Barney to the child's 
respiratory problems. (Preliminary Hearing Transcript at 152, 185.) There is evidence that 
the defendant hit the child on more than one occasion. (Preliminary Hearing Transcript at 
181-182.) There is evidence that the defendant maltreated the child. (Preliminary Hearing 
Transcript at 151.) There is evidence that the child was not injured on August 4, 1992, and 
that the defendant, along with Ms. Barney, had custody and care of the child at that time. 
(Preliminary Hearing Transcript at 139. ) 
The State's burden at preliminary hearing is not high. Viewing the evidence 
presented as a whole, this Court finds that the evidence presented is sufficient to support the 
bindover order. Although mostly circumstantial in nature, the evidence connecting this 
defendant to the death of Faith Barney rises to the level of probable cause. Accordingly, the 
defendant's Motion to Quash and Motion to Dismiss are hereby denied. 
Counsel for plaintiff is to prepare Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and an 
Order within 15 days of this decision consistent with the terms of this Ruling and submit it to 
opposing counsel for approval as to form prior to submission to the Court for signature. 
This Ruling has no effect until such Order is signed by the Court. 
4 
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Dated at Provo, this _£_ day oi \Ju/u^- ]yy.4 
BY THE COURT 
mgjrtjynn W. Davis^ 
Jim Taylor, Deputy County Attorney 
John Musselman, Esq. 
Linda Anderson, Esq. 
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IAL DISTRICT L OIMTY 
STATE OP UTAH 
STATE OP UTAH, l 
ORDER ON 
PlainLlLl, l DEFENDANT'S MOTION IN LIMINE, 
MOTION TO QUASH AND MOTION 
vs. t TO DISMISS 
GEE A I D IIKNF. BLUBAUGH t Case No. 921400519 PS 
11 in I in 111 mi! 11 in t i i i u d g e L y n n w i M y l a 
i ni ma t t e r cane be fo re the Com I r , n rhn Motions of t l le 
Deferu'liiiil on May 25P 1993 The Court: having made and en te red i t s 
F i rid i. uy H Il hi il iiiiiiii il i ' in'I us i INN if L i t i i il MI in i i h y O R D E R E D : 
1. The foilowiiig evidence wi, 1,1 not be introduced Iii, LI: le State 
as evidence in ti1' F» • >"i--il of this matter: 
a i ill upa-i1 photo'jraphe* I I In • \n rtim. 
t deotape r eco rd ings of the vict n. 
c Photographic d e p i c t i o n s of the v ic t mi 
c • dence of t l I i= • Defpnrlanl iii llir 11*| use and p r i o r 
drug counseling. 
e. Evidence of sexual abuse sustained by or 
i n£ 1 i c L ed b y I! •„ Ue i e 11 dan t. ' • :. • • ;• ': 
i Evidence of attempts by the Defe : .• la it to 
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restrain the victim through use of a harness. 
2. The Defendant's motion to limit introduction of videotaped 
recording of the Defendant's home on August 5, 1992, is denied. 
3. The Defendant's motion to limit introduction of testimony 
demonstrating the Defendant's knowledge of karate is denied. 
4. The Court reserves ruling on the Defendant's motion to 
limit the introduction of evidence of pattern of abuse and battered 
child syndrome until additional foundation has been proffered or 
provided to the Court. 
5. The Defendant's Motion to Quash the Bindover and to 
dismiss the charges in this matter is denied. 
DATED this /3 day of J*SeT 1993. 
BY THE COURT: 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
JOHN MUSSELMAN 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT 
2 
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•hA 
LINDA ANDERSON - -.»J 
ANDERSON, DREDGE, STRINGER AND BLAKELOCK, P.A. 
Attorney for Defendant 
2230 No. Univ. Parkway 
Suite 9-D 
Provo, Ut. 84604 
Telephone: (801) 37S-767R 
.D. JOHN MUSSELMAN ' '<•" ' 
Jamestown Square 
3507 University Ave, Hanover Bldg — 1 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Telephone: .(801) 375-7680 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE O UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
I 
vs. 
GERALD GENE BLUBAUGH, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND 
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
SUPPRESS AND REQUEST FOR 
EVIDENTIARY HEARING 
Crimiiki l lln ii inn I i 
Judge Davis 
COMES NOW, the Defendant, by and throug* « counsel, 
LINDA ANDERSON and • USSELMAN, pursuant to e 
following Memorandum oi Kint authorities in *«-,.
 Pw. 
Defendant's Motion to Suppress and Request for Evidentiary 
Hearing. 
or voluntarily went to the location of the third and final 
interrogation. 
The Defendant was subjected to situations in which he never 
felt free to leave and felt compelled to provide incriminating 
information to the Spanish Fork Police Department* In his second 
encounter with the Spanish Fork Police Department, Chief Dee 
Rosenbaum spoke with the Defendant at his home. This visit 
occurred August 5th, the same day Faith Barney was taken to the 
hospital. The officer arrived at the Defendant's residence 
within minutes after he had returned from the hospital. The 
Defendant and the co-Defendant returned to change their clothes 
as the life-flight helicopter carried Faith Barney to Primary 
Children's Hospital. 
The Defendant and Chief Rosenbaum, have known each other for 
some time and because of this factor, the Defendant felt he had 
no choice but to answer all of the Chief's questions and to allow 
Chief Rosenbaum to take the video of his home. The Defendant was 
not told the answers could be used against him and therefore 
cannot be assumed to have known that. 
If the Defendant had been formally given the option not to 
allow Chief Rosenbaum to enter his home, he would have denied 
access. Even though it could be argued that the Defendant did 
have an alternative option to deny consent, the Defendant here 
did not believe he had any choice. He was not asked a question; 
the Chief stated his intentions of coming to see the crib sheet 
13 2 
on the first visit and his intent to video the residence on the 
second. Due to the fact that he knew Chief Rosenbaum and was 
aware of his position of authority he felt compelled to allow the 
Chief to proceed. 
The Defendant did not feel free to leave. In fact, he was 
not in a situation where he could leave as the interview took 
place in his home. The fact that the Defendant allowed Chief 
Rosenbaum into his home does not equate to a voluntariness to 
provide inculpatory statements. As asserted in United States v. 
Berkowitz, 927 F.2d 1376, 1387 (7th Cir. 1991), "A person does 
not abandon his privacy interest in his home by opening his door 
from within to answer a knock." Although Berkowitz involved a 
Fourth Amendment intrusion, that rule applies to the case at hand 
in that the Defendant did not voluntarily waive his rights by 
allowing Chief Rosenbaum, a person of clear authority, to enter 
his residence. 
The Defendant had no question in his mind that the 
individual at his door was Chief Rosenbaum. The Defendant wanted 
to cooperate with the Chief in any way that would help. The 
Defendant was unsure about the encounters with the Spanish Fork 
Police Department, but was not in a position to question the 
authority of Chief Rosenbaum. Nor did the Chief provide an 
opportunity for the Defendant to question the Chief's authority. 
Further, the police took advantage of a highly emotional and 
vulnerable suspect. A small child for whom he cared deeply was 
in critical condition and he was rushing to Primary Children's 
14 
113 
something with the Court briefly. Maybe we can 
just come back and discuss it at a bench 
conference, but perhaps we can take it in the 
hall. 
(Off the record.) 
THE COURT: Going back on the record. 
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, there is 
a matter that has arisen, which somehow will 
need to be taken, a motion respecting some legal 
matters entirely. I'll need to rule on those. 
And based upon that ruling, then we'll know the 
direction. 
So we're going to excuse you briefly now. 
And-- I suppose that this will not take a long 
time in terms of the arguments-- and invite you 
back in in just a few moments. Thank you very 
much. 
(Whereupon, at 3:36 p.m., the jury was 
excused and the following proceedings 
continued:) 
MR. TAYLOR: If I may, Your Honor. 
I'm going to make a short proffer as to 
what our next item of evidence will be, about 
which I expect there will be an objection as we 
have discussed. I want to make that proffer so 
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1 that we can set up the frame work. 
2 Our.next item of evidence, Your Honor, we 
3 had intended to play the videotape as we have 
4 discussed with sound up. And I believe they have 
5 an objection, to which we'll respond. 
6 THE COURT: Mr. Musselman? 
7 MR. MUSSELMAN: Your Honor, the 
8 objection is—was previously argued, and the 
9 Court has ruled on the admissibility of the 
10 videotape. I don't think we've ever addressed 
11 whether it was going to be shown with or without 
12 sound. Quite frankly, I assumed it would be 
13 without. 
14 We have done research as to admissibility 
15 of the video tapes. And we have cited some of 
16 that research to the Court in the previous 
17 arguments. The Cloud case being one of those 
18 cases, which is in our memorandum. 
19 I don't recall any of the cases speaking to 
201 the issue of whether the sound ought or ought 
211 not to be up or down. But I do recall that each 
22 case we researched where the general 
23 admissibility of the tape was an issue the video 
241 was shown to the Court without sound. 
251 It's always been my experience when we've 
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1 used video tapes-- at least in this district--
2 they're shown without sound. 
3 And the logical basis for that is simply 
4 that a videotape with sound contains the 
5 commentary of the videoer of announcing, "I'm 
6 now looking at this" or "I'm now looking at 
7 that", or, "Hey, Bill, by the way, will you--" 
8 things of that nature. And the sound is not 
9 relevant to the proceeding. 
10 THE COURT: How is it prejudicial? 
11 MR. MUSSELMAN: Well, let me think 
121 about what that sound contains. 
13 THE COURT: You have an opportunity to 
14 cross examine the police chief who took the 
15 video, and certainly he would have the 
16 opportunity to even make commentary here in open 
17 court today under oath regarding the video. And 
18 if it were played without sound, would there be 
191 any basis upon which he could not comment as the 
20 jury is viewing the video? 
21 MR. MUSSELMAN: Oh, no. He could 
22 certainly be asked questions and comment as the 
23 jury views. 
241 The difference is, as I see it, I cannot 
25 directly cross examine nor can I object to 
Lesley Nelson -- CSR 
859 
1 questions and answers, because there are no 
21 questions on the video. There is simply a 
3 colloquy. 
41 Whereas, if we are showing a sound-less 
5i video and asking questions of the witness, if 
61 there's a question I object to, I can state that 
7 and the Court can rule. Furthermore, I can 
8 directly cross examine what he says on the stand 
91 in a fashion that is not as available in cross 
10 examining the videotape by later cross-examining 
11 the person on the stand. 
12 THE COURT: Have you viewed the 
13 videotape? 
14 MR. MUSSELMAN: I have viewed it. It's 
15 been awhile since I've looked at it. I'm trying 
16 to remember exactly what the sound contains. 
17 And my memory is more general. 
18 I remember a general monologue of walking 
191 around the house and announcing this and that. 
20 There is some give and take, as I recall it, 
21 between the chief and both Mr. Blubaugh and Ms. 
22 Barney. Quite frankly, I don't think there's 
23 anything said that's especially prejudicial. 
24 THE COURT: Well, that's what I'm 
251 attempting to determine. Is there anything that 
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1 you recall from your view of the video that is 
21 either objectionable, prejudicial in any form or 
3 fashion? 
41 MR. MUSSELMAN: I'm certain that 
51 there's no statement on the video where anyone 
61 says some—makes some earth-shattering statement 
7j about what happened to this baby. But on the 
81 other hand, because of its nature, of its being 
91 more or less a monologue, give and take that 
10 cannot be cross examined, I don't think it's 
11 relevant, and I think it may also violate the 
12| sixth amendment right to confrontation. 
13 THE COURT: If this Court has already 
14] determined that the defendant and the 
151 co-defendant voluntarily consented to the 
16j videotaping of the home doesn't the issue of 
171 consent then evaporate the issue of the other? 
18 MR. MUSSELMAN: Consent to the--
191 THE COURT: Absolute voluntarily 
201 consent to the videotaping of the home in 
211 question? 
22 MR. MUSSELMAN: Well, they consented to 
23 the videotaping, but I don't think that means 
24 they necessarily consented to the admission of 
25 the monologue. 
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1 THE COURT: Tell me again in your best 
21 articulation what is prejudicial or what is 
3 objectionable, counsel. If there's something 
4 there objectionable, I want to be sure the jury 
5 does not see it. If there's something there 
6 that is prejudicial that otherwise would not be 
7 admissible, I want to be sure that the jury does 
81 not see it. Articulate the best you can what is 
9 objectionable and what is prejudicial. 
10 MR. MUSSELMAN: I do not believe there 
111 is a specific statement made by either Ms. 
12 Barney or Mr. Blubaugh that is particularly 
13 objectionable. I do believe that a monologue by 
14 the person videoing of describing what he's 
15 looking at on the videotape is objectionable, 
16 because it is the-- it's an out-of-court 
17 statement made by this witness as opposed to the 
181 defendant or someone else. He should make his 
19 statements under oath in this courtroom, not 
20 under oath and on a videotape. 
21 THE COURT: Does the State wish to 
22 respond? 
23 MR. TAYLOR: First of all, even if 
24 Chief Rosenbaum were not present, his commentary 
25| on the tape I think would be admissible as an 
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1 exception to the hearsay rule, because it is a 
2 description of conditions then existing and then 
31 present. It is an exception to the hearsay rule. 
41 But it cannot be hearsay if the declarant is 
5 present testifying and available for 
61 cross-examinations. It is absolutely not a 
7 violation of the defendant's rights to confront 
81 a witness when the declarant is present. 
9J The only people who speak on the video — and 
10 we'd really have to play it for Your Honor. 
11 It's only about 10 minutes long-- but the only 
12 people who speak on it are the defendant, Chief 
13 Rosenbaum and Ms. Barney. And they have not 
141 objected to statements of either Ms. Barney or 
15 the defendant. 
16| Therefore, we only have the statements of 
17 the declarations of the witness who is here and 
18 who can be cross examined to any length they 
19 wish with regard to what he has said here under 
20 oath or what he said on the tape. 
21 Now, we'll be happy to put him under oath 
22 and ask him if he really meant what he said on 
23 the tape. But I think that's superfluous. And 
24 I don't think that's part and parcel of the 
25 right to confront and— the right to confront 
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1 and the right to cross examine. It simply does 
2 not violate any of their rights. We have 
3 determined that the statements were not made 
4 under oath. And we're not even talking about 
5 statements of the defendant. We think it's 
6 appropriate. 
7 THE COURT: Anything further? 
81 MR. MUSSELMAN: I've already spoken. 
9 We'll submit it. 
10 THE COURT: I'll allow it. I don't see 
11 any articulation on the part of the defense that 
12 it's prejudicial and is objectionable under law. 
13 The videotape is already ruled to be 
141 admissible. And this Court has already 
15 determined that defendants voluntarily consented 
16 to the videotaping of the home. 
17 A videotaping of a home-- a videotape has 
181 both an audio and a^ visual aspect to it. And 
191 I'll overrule your objection, counsel. It may be 
201 played to the jury. I'll then inform the--
211 (Off the record. ) 
221 THE COURT: We'll call the jury back 
23 in. 
241 (Whereupon, at 3:45 p.m., the jury 
25| returned, and the following proceedings 
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Testimony of Carol Brumfield 
THE WITNESS: Yes. 
MS. CAROL BRUMFIELD, 
called as a witness, having first been 
duly sworn, was examined and testified as 
follows: 
THE COURT: Be seated here. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MS. BALDWIN: 
Q Would you please state your name and 
spell your last name for the record. 
A Carl Brumfield, B-R-U-M-F-I-E-L-D. 
Q What is your occupation? 
A I'm a registered nurse. 
Q And how long have you been a nurse? 
A Oh, gosh. 35 years. Been at Mountain 
View Hospital for seven as head nurse of the 
nursery and pediatrics. 
Q Is that where you're currently 
employed? 
A Yes. 
Q Do you have any children? 
A I have three sons. 
Q And how old are they? 
A 24, 22 and 21. 
Q And you're employed at Mountain View 
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ll Hospital. Is that in Payson? 
21 A Yes. 
3 Q Do you recall sometime in early July of 
4 1992 an instance in which you had contact with 
5 Faith Barney? 
6 A Yes, I do. 
7 Q What was the nature of that contact? 
8 A Faith had come in to the hospital to 
9 have surgery on a fractured elbow. And they did 
10 her surgery and felt that it was extensive 
111 enough she should be admitted, which she was 
12 admitted to our pediatric unit. 
13 Q Do you recall the exact date that that 
14 would have been? 
15 A It was like the 6th of July. 6th or 
16 7th. It was right after the 4th of July. 
17 Q Was anyone with Faith when she came to 
18 the hospital that day? 
19 A Well, I wouldn't know when she came to 
20 the hospital, because she went directly to 
211 same-day surgery. Came to us after she'd had 
22 the surgery, and had gone to the recovery room. 
23 Q Did you see her with anyone at that 
24 time? 
251 A Well--and she came up in the evening 
I 
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1 after I'd gone, but her mother and Blu were 
2 there the next morning when I came on duty. 
3 Q Are you acquainted with either Christy 
4 Barney or Gerald Blubaugh? 
5 A I've seen Christy several times, and 
6 I've seen Blu under much shorter circumstances. 
7 Q So you recognized him at that time? 
81 A Yes, I did. 
91 Q Describe what happened when you saw 
10 them. 
Ill A Well, the situation that-- that was a 
12 morning--
13 MR. MUSSELMAN: Your Honor, may we 
14 approach for a moment? 
15 THE COURT: You may. 
161 ( Off the record at the bench, not 
171 reported. ) 
18 Q (BY MS. BALDWIN) Where exactly were 
19 Christy and Blu? 
201 A They were in her room, 2003, on 
21 pediatrics. 
221 Q That's Faith's room? 
23 A That was Faith's room that she was 
24 given after she came back from--
251 Q And where were each of those 
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1 individuals located in the room? 
2 A Christy was sitting in a chair 
3 immediately as you go in to the door on the 
4 right. It was breakfast time. We do serve a 
5 tray to the mother. And she was eating, and 
6 Faith was sitting in a highchair with a cast on 
7 her arm, and Blu was over on a cot that we 
8 provide. 
9 Q Was-- maybe I missed this. Where was 
10 Christy in proximity to Faith? 
11 h Christy was sitting at her side of the 
12 bed. I mean, the highchair was between Christy 
13 and the bed, and Christy was sitting in a chair 
14 right by the wall, by the window. Very close. 
15 Q Did you observe Blu move from the cot? 
16 A I did. 
17 Q And what happened when he moved? 
18 A Christy--
19 Q First of all, where did he move to? 
20 A He moved from the cot and walked toward 
21 the foot of the crib. 
221 Q And what did you observe? 
23 A I observed-- when I went in, I was just 
24 talking to Faith a minute. And she was kind of 
25 happy and smiling. And Blu got off his cot and 
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1 walked over. And Faith looked over at him and 
2 had kind a kind of terrified look — 
3 MR. MUSSELMAN: I'm going to object to 
4 a characterization. If she's telling about what 
5 she observed — 
6 THE WITNESS: I'm telling you what I 
7 observed. 
81 MR. MUSSELMAN: I'll object to any 
9 characterization of what she observed. 
10 THE COURT: She can testify as to what 
11 she observed. 
12 THE WITNESS: And she looked over at 
13 him, and then kind of with-- what I — appeared 
14 to me a terrified look — 
15 MR. MUSSELMAN: I'll object to — 
16 THE WITNESS: — and then she looked 
17 over at her mother. 
18 MR. MUSSELMAN: Wait just a moment, 
19 ma'am. 
201 The testimony is that she looked over at 
21 Blu. And I think it's time for the next 
221 question. Beyond that, we're getting into a 
23 characterization of how it looked to me. 
241 THE WITNESS: I understood that that's 
251 what she asked me. 
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1 THE COURT: She can testify as to what 
2 she observed, and you can follow up with the 
3 next question, counsel. 
4 MS. BALDWIN: Well, I think at this 
5 point, we'll move on to something else. 
6 Q (BY MS. BALDWIN) Are you familiar with 
7 the practice known as swaddling--
8] A I'm not too familiar with that. 
9 Q -- with children? Wrapping them in a 
10 blanket? 
Ill A Oh, sure. 
121 Q Do you work a lot with newborn — 
131 A I'm over the newborns. 
141 Q So you work with young children most of 
15 the time? 
161 A That's my job. I'm a manager for the 
17 nurses who do that, plus I also take direct 
18 patient care. 
19 Q So is the-- is the practice of 
20 swaddling used generally with newborns? 
21 A Oh, I think that's-- I think we do. 
22 Q That's a typical practice? 
23 A I would think it's a nature, too, just 
24 to the fact that they're newborns. 
25| Q Do you work with any children that are 
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older than newborns? 
A Our pediatric unit takes the child and 
youth to 18. 
Q Would this practice of swaddling be 
common in children, say, eight months old? 
A Possibly. 
Q Is there a general timeframe where you 
would expect a child to be swaddled, where that 
would be a normal procedure? 
A I don't know that you could put a date 
on it. I think some children like to be swaddled 
and some just don't. 
Q Is that the standard that you use to 
determine whether you swaddle the child or not? 
A Not age, necessarily. It's just what 
the need of the child is. If the child cries, 
or seems lonely, or--
Q What their reaction is to it? 
A Uh-huh. 
Q Would you say that it would be unusual 
fo: an older child several months old to be 
swaddled? 
A Not unusual. 
MS. BALDWIN: No further questions. 
I'm sorry. Just a couple more questions. 
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1 Q (BY MS. BALDWIN) You stated that 
2 you've been a pediatric nurse for 35 years? 
3 A No. I've been an R.N. for 35 years. I 
4 taught at B.Y.U. for 17 years, probably five of 
5 which of that was teaching at Primary. 
61 I was also a community education manager at 
7 Primary before I came to Mountain View. And I 
81 also was head nurse of the newborn and Ped. Unit 
9 at a hospital in Mississippi for two years prior 
10 to that. And four years prior to that I worked 
11 in the Neonatal Intensive Care unit in Baton 
12 Rouge, Louisiana. 
13 Q So you've had an extensive dealings 
14 with children and their reactions— 
15 A Well, I feel--
16| Q -- to various circumstances? 
171 A Not that we can always get them, but I 
18 feel like I do. 
191 Q Is one of your methods of caring for 
201 children looking to see how they react under 
21 certain circumstances and responding to that? 
22 A Always. That's something we always do 
23 is observe that child. 
24 Q When Mr. Blubaugh got up and went 
251 towards Faith you observed an expression on her 
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1 face; is that correct? 
2 A I did. 
3 Q How did you characterize that 
41 expression? 
5 MR. MUSSELMAN: Objection. Calls for 
6 an opinion that neither this witness nor any 
7 other can give to interpret the intent of an 
81 infant with an expression on her face. 
9 MS. BALDWIN: I don't believe it's an 
10 improper opinion. I believe that anyone 
111 experienced with children would be able to give 
12 that properly, that that objection would go to 
13 the weight, not to the admissibility. 
14 MR. MUSSELMAN: Well, the reason it's 
15 objectionable, Your Honor, is if we have a half 
16 a dozen experts and expressions on the part of 
17 children, we'll probably have a half a dozen 
18 opinions as to what-that expression meant. 
19 THE COURT: So no one can testify as 
20 it relates to the response of a child? 
21 MR. MUSSELMAN: I don't think anyone 
22 can. Certainly this witness has not been 
23 qualified as an expert of time in interpreting 
241 expressions of a child. 
25 THE COURT: Anything further? 
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1 MS. BALDWIN: No, Your Honor. 
2 THE COURT: She has 35 years of 
3 experience as an R.N. and other capacities, 
4 deals specifically over that period of time with 
5 the responses and reactions of children as a — 
61 now as a head pediatric nurse. 
7j I'll allow her to respond. 
81 MS. BALDWIN: What was your — 
91 THE COURT: What did you observe? 
10 THE WITNESS: She-- her eyes kind of 
11 opened. Her-- she kind of looked forward, and 
12 lowered her eyes, and looked at her mother. 
13 Q (BY MS. BALDWIN) What did you 
14 interpret that to be? 
15 A Fear. 
16 MS. BALDWIN: I have no further 
17 questions. 
18 THE COURT: You may cross examine. 
19 CROSS EXAMINATION 
20 BY MR. MUSSELMAN: 
21 Q Mrs. Brumfield, how many times in the 
22 past have you been called upon in a court of law 
23 to give an opinion as to interpreting the 
241 meaning of a child's expression? 
251 A In a court of law, I haven't. 
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1 Q Never before? 
21 A No. I have at the hospital, and we've 
3 charted it. We've talked to doctors. 
41 Q I'm going to get to that in a minute. 
5i A Okay. 
61 Q My first question is: In a court of 
7 law, and the answer is never until today; is. 
8 that right? 
91 A Never until today. 
10 Q Now, outside of a court of law how many 
11 times have you been called upon to interpret the 
121 communication intended by a child by a facial 
13 expression? 
14 A I would say we do it daily. We do 
151 assessments daily. We watch children. 
16| Q To interpret facial expressions into 
17 verbal communications? 
18 A Yes. We can interpret pain, we can 
191 interpret fear. We can interpret happiness very 
20 easily. 
21 Q How old was this child on the 1st of 
22 July? 
23 A She was about 14 months. She was born 
24| in April 
251 Q Okay. In your experience, in the 35 
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1 years as a registered nurse, not all of that has 
2 been in child care or pediatrics; is that true? 
3 A Not all. 
4| Q How much of it has been in pediatrics? 
5 A I would say probably near 15 years. 
61 Q In your experience, at least 15 years 
7 of which has been in pediatrics, have you 
8 observed occasions when either yourself or 
9 others have come up with differing 
10 interpretations from a child's facial 
11 expressions? 
12 A Oh, I guess sometimes, but not 
13 usually. We all seem to kind of agree. 
14 Q How do you know the difference in a 
151 child's expression between fear and pain? 
16 A Well, you're-- pain, you don't always 
17 get the wide eyes, and it doesn't come on 
18 suddenly. It's more of a quiet. Some of them 
19 cry, some of them don't in pain. 
20 Q How do you tell the difference in a 
211 13-month-old child's facial expression as to 
22 whether it's fear or whether it is surprise? 
23 A I'm not sure there's a lot of 
24 difference. But surprise doesn't have the gloomy 
25 look that you get with fear. 
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1 Q How do you tel3 the difference between 
2 a child's facial expression whether it's fear or 
3| whether it's startle? 
41 A Well, startle usually is fully instant. 
51 Q When we say "startle", we mean the--
6| A And usually with startling there's a 
7 neurological response to that, a startle reflex. 
8| Q How long did you stay in the room with 
9 Christy, and Blu, and Faith and observe from the 
10 time of the child's reaction that you say you 
11 observed? How long did you stay in the room? 
121 A I was in the room probably about five 
131 minutes. 
14 Q At what point in the five minutes did 
15 the reaction of the child occur that you 
16 observed? 
171 A Halfway through, probably. Maybe a 
18j little more than halfway. 
19 Q So maybe another two minutes after that 
20 and you left the room? 
21 A Uh-huh. Which we talked with Christy. 
22\ And Blu stood at the bottom of the bed, but he 
23 did not enter in. 
24 Q Was the child crying any of that time? 
25 A No. She didn't cry, 
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1 Q Was she clinging during any of that 
2 time? 
3 A No, but she was-- she had slid to the 
41 side of her chair a little. 
5 Q Slid around a little? 
6 A Uh-huh. 
7 MR. MUSSELMAN: That's all I have. 
81 THE COURT: Anything further? 
9 MS. BALDWIN: Nothing further, Your 
10 Honor. We would ask that this witness be 
111 excused. 
12 MR. MUSSELMAN: No objection. 
13 THE COURT: Thank you very much. 
14 THE WITNESS: You bet. 
15 THE COURT: You may be excused now. 
16 MS. BALDWIN: The State calls Cory 
17 Blubaugh. 
18 THE COURT: Mr. Blubaugh, if you'd 
19 come forward and be sworn, please. 
20 THE CLERK: You do solemnly swear that 
21 the testimony you shall give in the case now 
22 pending before the Court will be the truth, the 
23 whole truth, and nothing but the truth so help 
24 you God. 
25 THE WITNESS: Yes. 
I 
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11 was neglect." Mr. Blubaugh told you when he 
2 testified that when he moved in with Faith and 
3 Christy in February, there were no physical 
4 injuries to Faith. No one has testified to any 
5 physical injuries to Faith prior to February of 
6 1992. 
71 The only suggestion of a physical injury 
81 would be the possible drop on the head and the 
9 perhaps the suggestion that an eye rolling back may 
10 have somehow been involved, but Dr. Berman told you 
111 that that was not the case. That there was no 
121 report of that. The foster mother told you that 
131 that cleared. 
14 The crly evidence we have on that is that 
15 it most likely occurred while the baby was in the 
16] care of a babysitter, not in the care of Christy. 
17 There was simply no other evidence of physical 
18 abuse. 
191 Since February of 1992 all of the injuries 
2 01 that I have described took place. That's when 
21 Mr. Blubaugh moved in with Christy. But even more 
22 important, of injuries to Faith, perhaps the broken 
23 back was the most interesting. 
24 Dr. Frikke testified about it that the 
25 only way that those ligaments could have been 
. i&£3 
1 transected was for the baby to have literally been 
21 folded in half. She told you that that was a very 
31 unusual injury. I think she said she had never 
4 investigated the death of a child and seen that as 
5 an injury in connection with that. 
#| Dr. Britton, I believe testified that it 
7 was unusual. It's almost a signature injury. 
81 Remember what Blu told you. Rona Harding said that 
91 Blu held the baby tight to the point that the baby 
10 was struggling for air; to the point that it was 
11 difficult for the baby to cry. 
12 Now, Mr. Blubaugh said, "That's an 
13 exaggeration. "Sure, I held the baby like that, 
14 and I held the baby in a fetal position to put the 
15 baby to bed --" corroborating that method of care 
16 — "but I just didn't squeeze that tight." 
17 There was absolutely no evidence that no 
18 one else, including Christy, ever engaged in that 
19 kind of holding and in that kind of behavior to put 
20 the child to bed. 
21 Blu's medical knowledge and experience was 
22 undisputed. He was a medic in the Army. That 
23 doesn't make him a doctor, but he told you he knows 
24 that when a baby is deprived of oxygen, when a baby 
25 is severely struck on the head, that that could 
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